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ABSTRACT
Tankson, Janice V. Ed.D. The University of Memphis, May 2012. An
Examination of Principal’s Perceptions toward Teacher Performance Pay in
Tennessee. Major Professor: Reginald L. Green
There have been many programs and initiatives used throughout the
United State that have answered the call of educational reform; however,
performance pay programs continues to lead the discussion of incentives to
improve academic achievement. Nevertheless, there continues to be a lack of
clarity regarding its effectiveness. In addition, to addressing the challenge of
improving academic achievement, performance pay is also being recognized as
a tool to assist with teacher retention which has become a serious issue for many
school districts across the nation. While many teachers are retiring, many others
are taking the option of leaving the profession due to low morale, low
compensation, and/or unfavorable working conditions. Many Americans are
aware of the importance of having quality teachers in the classrooms in order for
students to excel. However, even more are beginning to acknowledge the
necessity for increasing teachers’ salaries as a means of the retaining the best
and the brightest.
The purpose of this study is to determine school principals’ perceptions of
teacher performance pay programs, specifically in Tennessee. This study also
addresses the issues of gaining and retaining quality educators through the
implementation of performance pay programs and investigates the principals’
perception of pay for performance as motivating factors for teachers and
principals to help increase student achievement.
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Since performance pay has

been such a polarizing topic in the education field, this study also examines
principals’ perception of performance pay programs as fair and equitable and
whether performance pay improves the instructional effectiveness of teachers.
Through this study, the researcher gained greater insight into the
thoughts, and opinions of principals in Tennessee regarding the impact of
teacher performance pay. While the analysis from Tennessee principals’
perceptions from this study did not vary much from other studies, it does suggest
that if a performance pay program is to be successful in the state of the
Tennessee it must be open to all schools in a school district, transparent, and
substantial to motivate action. But most importantly, it cannot be a standalone
program. There must be other initiatives that will aid in student achievement.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Performance pay was first documented in England around 1710 (Troen &
Boles, 2005). During this time, teachers’ salaries were based on the results of
students’ test scores on exams in reading, writing, and arithmetic. Performance
pay was so pervasive that the school system revised the curriculum to include
only subjects that were testable. Coursework in art, music and science nearly
disappeared. As a result, teaching became more mechanical as teachers found
that repetition produced “best” results. Consequently, some teachers and
principals began to falsify test results to secure their salaries (Troen & Boles,
2005). The plan was eventually eliminated. However, the failure of performance
pay in 1710 has not prevented states and school districts all over the world from
venturing into performance pay plans as an effort to improve academic
performance in schools. Over the last century, multiple iterations of performance
pay programs have emerged many times ending with unintended consequences
or in failure.
Multiple examples highlight the history of unintended consequences
and/or failure of performance pay programs aimed at increasing student
achievement. For example, the Texarkana school district implemented a
performance pay program to help close the performance gap between black and
white students, and the poor and wealthy students. More specifically, this District
was the first to use standardized tests as an evaluating tool for performance pay.
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However, scandal arose when it was found that students were cheating on the
standardized test (Wilms & Chapleau, 1999).
In 1969, President Richard Nixon championed a plan called “performance
contracting.” The financial incentives of the plan failed to produce expected
academic gains. However, the plan generated damaging educational practices
such as falsifying school records and teaching to the test to artificially boost test
scores (Troen & Boles, 2005). The dismal results of the program eventually
doomed “performance contracting,” and the program was declared a failure.
Another example of a failed state merit pay program is the Texas Educator
Excellence Grant (TEEG). Educators in the state of Texas spent 300 million
dollars on a performance pay system for teachers and found that it did not
produce significant gains in student achievement (Stutz, 2009). Furthermore,
there was evidence of test falsification.
A school district in Newton, Massachusetts developed the first
performance pay program in the United States (English, 1992). The program
was designed to appease the public and increase student achievement.
Nonetheless, during the first half of the 20th century in the United States, most
teachers’ salaries were based on a fixed schedule that included years of
experience and education level. This “single salary” approach was partly a
response to the capriciousness and discrimination that existed under more
discretionary forms of compensation (Dee & Keys, 2004). In the late 1980s, this
approach for compensating teachers came under sharp criticism for failing to
attract, motivate and retain high-quality teachers. In response, reform efforts
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proliferated espousing linking teachers’ pay to performance (Dee & Keys, 2004).
By 1986, twenty-nine states had initiated some sort of merit pay for teachers
(Cohn & Teel, 1992). These programs often encountered strong opposition from
teachers’ unions and were often eliminated or altered after a few years of
implementation. By 1997, only 12% of school districts used performance pay
(Dee & Keys, 2004).
The state of Tennessee has a history of implementing performance pay
programs-- from the Career Ladder Program to the Project on Incentives in
Teaching Program (POINT). Each of the programs had its own pros and cons;
still, the state continues to look for ways to improve student achievement. In
January 2010, the Tennessee Legislature passed a sweeping educational reform
bill that allowed school systems to use TVAAS (Tennessee Value Added
Assessment System) data as part of teacher and principal evaluations.
Tennessee’s government officials expected that this would strengthen
Tennessee’s performance pay programs and the state’s application for the Race
to the Top federal grant proposed by the President of the United States, Barack
Obama. Many believe that because of the passage of this legislation,
Tennessee was awarded the $500 million in Race to the Top grant funding. This
grant allowed Tennessee the ability to use federal funding to aid in recruiting,
developing, rewarding, and retaining effective teachers and principals (U.S.
Department of Education, 2010).
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Statement of the Problem
Performance pay continues to resurface in educational arenas across
America as a tool to improve academic performance of students who attend
America’s schools. Even though performance pay programs have not been
successful in recent times and unsustainable if you review the history of the
movement, many politicians and educators still advocate such plans to improve
academic performance of students (Troen & Boles, 2005). There continues to be
a lack of clarity regarding the effectiveness of performance pay programs on the
academic achievement of students. This study examines four core issues:
1.) Principals’ perception of teacher performance pay programs as fair and
equitable;
2.) Principals’ perception of teacher performance pay programs as a
means to retain quality educators;
3.) Principals’ perception of teacher performance pay programs as a mean
to enhance the quality of teacher selection; and
4.) Principals’ perceptions of teacher performance pay programs as a tool
to enhance the instructional effectiveness of teachers.
Significance of the Study
This topic of study is particularly timely, as teacher retention is rapidly
becoming a serious issue for many school districts across the nation. According
to the National Education Association, as student population increase, more than
two million teachers will retire in the next decade. This will have a serious impact
on the workforce and the quality of education provided to students. What is even
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more serious and critical is that while many teachers are taking the option of
retiring, many teachers are taking the option of leaving the profession all together
due to low morale, low compensation and/or unfavorable working conditions
(Homeroom Teacher, 2006). In the article, The Essential Profession: American
Education at the Crossroads, released in 2001, “nearly 9 in 10 Americans (88%)
favor raising teacher salaries,” even at the cost of raising taxes. Many
Americans are aware of the importance of having quality teachers in the
classrooms in order for students to excel. However, even more are beginning to
acknowledge the necessity for increasing teachers’ salaries as a means of the
retaining the best and the brightest. So even though performance pay programs
have historically been plagued with problems, the implementation of an effective
performance pay program may be the solution to the teacher shortage by
retaining highly qualified teachers and principals through financial stipends based
upon student performance.
The significance of this study also discerns principals’ positive or negative
perceptions of performance pay programs as they relate to improving the
academic achievement of students. This is particularly important in the
southeastern part of the United States where there are strong initiatives to
enhance performance pay programs. A review of the literature in this field, in
addition to the Tennessee principals’ survey data, show possible motivators for
teachers include financial stipends, recognition for academic achievement taking
place inside the classroom, and commendations for acceptance of additional
responsibilities at the school level. The principals play a key role in this manner
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and their perceptions and knowledge of what works well within their schools can
inform decision makers on how to enhance the establishment of performance
pay programs or think of other alternatives.
Assumptions
The assumptions that underlie this research consist of the following: (1)
Principals want to see teachers rewarded for increased student achievement; (2)
Principals will not favor some performance pay programs due to the lack of
understanding; and (3) The recommendations from this study can influence
decision maker on whether to enhance teacher performance programs or to look
for other options to improve student achievement.
Research Questions
1. To what extent, if any, do principals perceive that teacher performance
pay programs are fair and equitable?
2. To what extent, if any, do principals perceive that teacher performance
pay programs influence the retention of teachers in schools?
3. To what extent, if any, do principals perceive that teacher performance
pay programs will enhance the quality of teacher selection?
4. To what extent, if any, do principals perceive that teacher performance
pay programs will enhance the instructional effectiveness of teachers?
Definitions
1. Evaluation: A methodical process used to establish the merit, value,
and worth of a teacher’s performance.
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2. High-Stakes Testing: An assessment in which imperative
consequences (school status, teacher licensure) are associated with
the results.
3. Incentive Pay: The allocation of special payment or salary increments
to a teacher who does additional work.
4. Improve Teacher Performance: Programs and/or initiatives that
enhance a teacher’s ability to improve teaching and learning in the
classroom.
5. Merit Pay: Raise in pay based on a set of criteria set by the employer
(Economic Policy Institute, 2009).
6. Negative Effects of Performance Pay: Unfavorable results (decrease
in student achievement, teacher performance, and teacher retention)
occur when a Performance Pay program is implemented.
7. Performance Pay: Performance pay is a generic term for any device
that adjusts salaries or provides compensation to reward higher levels
of performance. It comes in many different forms, including
merit/performance-based salary schedules, bonuses, incentive pay,
and differential staffing or “master teacher” plans (Ellis, 2000; Ryan &
Cooper, 1995).
8. Performance Pay Portfolio: A portfolio that contains records that
document a teacher’s or principal’s progress throughout the school
year. These artifacts may include evaluations, recommendations,
commendation, student achievement data and school data.
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9. Positive Effects of Performance Pay: Favorable results (increase in
student achievement, teacher performance, and teacher retention)
occur when a Performance Pay program is implemented.
10. Quality Teacher: A teacher who has strong academic skills in their field
of study and can effectively teach and improve student achievement
(Ehrenberg & Brewer, 1994).
11. Reward: Something that is given to identify deserving performance
12. Student Performance: Measure of student acquired knowledge in
academic skills
13. Teacher Retention: A school system’s ability to retain a teacher over 3
years.
Theoretical Framework
The researcher examined several theories used to justify performance pay
and found that the theories that substantiate this study are the Two Factor
Theory or Motivational-Hygiene Theory by Frederick Herzberg and the
Expectancy Theory by Victor Vroom (McClelland, 2005). The MotivationalHygiene Theory purports that people have two distinctive needs: to grow
psychologically and to avoid pain. Intrinsic and extrinsic factors can motivate
people toward psychological growth. Performance Pay is an example of an
extrinsic factor. The 1960s model of employee theory – Expectancy Theory
(Vroom, 1964) can also be applied to today’s performance pay program. The
Expectancy Theory, developed by Victor Vroom, in 1964, states that a reward will
motivate employees to produce more. Vroom’s theory maintains that people
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expect that their best efforts will lead to good performance and in return, the
good performance will be rewarded. In an effort to promote successful teaching
practices in the classroom and ultimately student achievement, according to
Vroom’s theory, teachers will go the extra mile if they value the pay for
performance reward. School districts that model a performance pay system after
Vroom’s theory must have clear goals that they would like the teachers and
principals to attain. They must encourage employees to excel and have buy-in
that the reward is worth the gain and is attainable with hard work. The
researcher relied on the Expectancy Theory to a greater extent due to its better
balance of intrinsic and extrinsic motivating factors. It usually is a equal balance
between the two factors that motivates individuals who choose the education
field as a career choice.
Organization of the Study
Chapter 1 introduces the research problem, including background of the
problem, research questions, significance, definitions, theoretical framework, and
the outline of the study. Chapter 2 provides an overview of performance pay
programs in America; sets the historical context, and examines the positive and
negative views of past performance pay programs set forth by known experts in
the field. Chapter 3 discusses the research design, and methods used as a
structure and guide for the study. Chapter 4 consists of the analysis and
synthesis of the data, and will also show the results of the study. Lastly, Chapter
5 discusses and summarizes the study and showcase key findings as well as any
implications or limitations of the research.

9

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Models of Teacher Compensation
There have been many programs and initiatives used throughout the
United State that have answered the call of educational reform; however,
performance pay programs continues to lead the discussion of incentives to
improve academic achievement. Due to the United States’ relatively poor
performance in science and math test scores, in comparison to other countries,
the federal government continues to seek ways to stimulate interest in the design
and implementation of performance-related pay policies (Sclafani &Tucker,
2006).
The use of a performance pay program dates back to the early 1700s in
England when teachers’ salaries were tied to student test scores (Gratz, 2005).
Teachers were financially compensated according to the academic success of
their students. This practice was also used in the United States until the late 19 th
Century, when it was replaced with salary schedules that are most commonly
used today. Podgursky and Springer (2006) identified three distinct models in
the history of teacher pay policies: negotiated room and board compensation,
grade-based compensation, and the position-automatic or single salary schedule
model.
During the early 19th Century in America, the emerging transportation
system led people to rural, agrarian-based locations to work and prosper
(Protsik, 1995). Out of this type of community materialized the one-room
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schoolhouse educational system and thus, the room and board compensation
model. In this model, teachers received small stipends and room and board by
rotating their residence to different homes (Protsik, 1995). This practice attracted
and retained teachers to the geographically isolated locations, and allowed
teachers to teach academic content and instill moral character into their
schoolchildren (Podgursky & Springer, 2006).
The demand for a skilled and educated workforce increased in the late
19th and early 20th century as America became more industrialized. As a result,
teacher compensation policies were revisited and the grade-based model was
introduced. The grade-based compensation model was designed to pay teachers
according to the level of skill needed to educate a child at their point of
educational attainment. Since it was believed that elementary age students were
easier to educate less formal training was required to teach them. Conversely, it
was believed that secondary age students required a teacher with more skills
and knowledge; therefore, they should be paid more than an elementary teacher
(Guthrie, Springer, Rolle, & Houck, 2007). This design eventually resulted in
gender- and racial-based inequities, and also preferential treatment of teachers.
At the turn of the 20th Century, labor leaders demanded better working
conditions and salaries for their constituents. As a by-product of many strikes
and boycotts, the position-automatic, or single salary schedule, emerged
(Podgursky & Springer, 2006).

The single salary schedule allowed teachers

with the same years of experience and education level to receive the same pay
(Hayes, 2006). It was supposed to create equity and employee satisfaction
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across the grade levels (Odden & Kelley, 2002). The model was also viewed as
fair, easy to understand, bias-free, and easy to administer (Scherer, 2003).
Educators knew what their salaries would be one year to the next with little
uncertainly (Koppich, 2008). Since the inception of the single salary schedule
model, 97% of all school districts in America have implemented this form of
teacher compensation (Hayes, 2006).
Even though the single salary schedule model was popular across the
U.S., it was not without flaws. The model has been very popular among teacher
rights advocates; however, student achievement has continued to decline. Some
educators believed that it ignored major issues, such as the differences in
teachers’ skill level and knowledge, their ability to increase student achievement,
and recruiting teachers to teach difficult subject matter (Hassel, 2002).

There

was no correlation between pay and performance and many good teachers were
leaving the field for better paying jobs (Goldhaber, 2008). In modern society
where high-stakes testing and teacher shortages are the norm, the lack of
accountability for student achievement was a major concern (Scherer, 2003).
Critics argued that the single salary schedule model only rewarded teachers for
longevity and offered no tangible incentives for exemplary performance.
With many criticisms of the single salary schedules, educators looked
toward other performance-related pay reforms. Performance Pay, formerly
known as merit pay, originated as a result of the Nation at Risk report in 1983
(Clardy, 1988). Proponents of performance pay programs believed that student
achievement would increase when the best teachers were offered salary
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increases. They also believed this program would help retain quality teachers in
the field of education. Lavy (2007) identified two major benefits to performance
pay. He noted that if teacher wages were based upon student performance, the
teachers would teach what was valued in society thus creating improved
productivity. He also noted that teachers would find a plethora of ways to
enhance student performance; teachers would be encouraged to gain
professional development, which will improve their craft; and teachers who were
not able to lift student performance would be identified and recommended to
discontinue in the educational profession thus resulting in improved efficiency.
Performance Pay Revisited
Performance pay programs have generated much controversy in the
educational arena, primarily because of the apprehension of the design,
implementation practices, and equity in the disbursement of rewards. However,
during the last two decades, there has been a new wave of interest in
performance pay programs in the United States (Hammond & McDermott, 1997).
This interest has been fueled by the need to improve student achievement in
addition to the need to provide opportunities to award exemplary teacher
performance (Odden & Kelly, 1997).
The outcry for teacher accountability by community members, local, state,
and federal entities across the nation have given rise to the concern for change
in the way teachers are compensated. During the 1999 Educational Summit,
governors and leaders of business and education, created a system of “rewards
and consequences” for teachers in the form of “competitive salary structures” that
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would ultimately tie teachers’ salaries to student achievement (Holt, 2001;
Odden, 2000). The basic fundamental principle of this system was that workers
should be paid on the basis of their skills and performances.
While there are multiple theories that might explain what motivates people
to succeed to attaining their goals, Victor Vroom’s Expectancy Theory is the most
applicable to performance pay in education. Vroom’s theory maintains that
people expect that their best efforts lead to good performance and in return, that
the good performance is rewarded. Essentially, people are more likely to work
harder to excel at a task if they believe the reward they desire is one of value
(Green, 2005).
Types of Performance Pay
Performance pay is a catch-all phrase describing various programs
designed to pay teachers for accomplishing specific goals. In the United States,
the types of programs that are most commonly used are school-based
performance awards, knowledge and skills-based pay, and merit pay. The
school-based performance award program is the most desired among teachers
and principals because bonuses are given to all teachers and administrators
when the school achieves their academic goals or benchmarks (Milanowski,
2006). It is also the most frequently used type of performance pay program in
the United States (Hassel, 2002). The school-based performance award
program allows for principals and teachers to continue to receive their single
salary schedule while still acquiring the additional rewards or bonuses (Heneman
& Milanowski, 2007). What makes it most desirable is that everyone buys-in to
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the concept that each person is responsible for the academic success of the
students and each person is rewarded accordingly.
The second type of performance pay program is knowledge and skills
based pay where teachers’ and principals’ salaries are based upon the level of
educational and professional development attained plus teacher demonstrated
performance (Milanowski, 2006). The knowledge and skills based pay program
originated in the private school sector to improve classroom instruction by
prompting teachers to acquire specific skills designed to increase student
achievement (Hayes, 2006). The specific skills could range from teachers
attaining additional graduate degrees, dual certifications, or National Board
certifications to teachers and principals attending a variety of professional
development seminars or completing performance portfolios (Heneman &
Milanowski, 2007). Since supporters of this model believe that the most
influential component of student achievement is a teacher’s knowledge and skills,
one of the core strengths of the knowledge and skill based programs is its ability
to aid teachers in creating a culture of continuous learning and ultimately student
achievement, (Dowling, Murphy, & Wang, 2007). According to Podgursky
(2008), 40% of teachers, accounting for 18% of school districts in the United
States, receive bonuses from attaining NBPTS certifications.
Lastly, the third type of performance pay programs is merit pay. The merit
pay program is a reward program that is mainly centered on student outcomes
which are attributed to a particular teacher or group of teachers rather than skills
and knowledge (Besharov, 2007). Merit pay rewards teachers based on student
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performance, classroom observations, or even teacher evaluations. It comes in
many different forms, including merit-based salary schedules, bonuses, incentive
pay, and differential staffing or “master teacher” plans (Ellis, 2000; Ryan &
Cooper, 1995). Of all of the performance pay programs, this is the least desired.
Opponents argue that it has two flaws: (1.) it lacks funding available to support
those who are worthy of the monetary reward; and (2.) it is too subjective in
selecting who qualifies and is deserving of the rewards. Even beyond the obvious
flaws, it has been found that merit pay programs do not produce the desired
results in schools (Heneman & Milanowski, 2007).
Proponents of Performance Pay
There continues to be controversy around the topic of performance pay.
In a society that believes that rewards or bonuses should be based on outcomes,
not inputs, proponents of performance pay expect teachers to be accountable for
student results (Ramirez, 2001). When teachers achieve the results then they
should be properly compensated. According to Eckert (2010), teacher quality
has a huge effect on student achievement. Therefore, school districts must
implement programs that retain and train the best teachers in the classroom.
Thus, many school districts around the country have implemented performancepay programs. According to Sultanik (2000), the driving force for performance
pay programs is based on the following key beliefs:
1. Student achievement will improve if teachers are offered substantial
incentives to improve their instruction;
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2. Public school compensation models can be parallel to those in the
private sector;
3. Exemplary teachers should be paid more than mediocre teachers;
4. Traditional compensation plans that incorporate tenure programs
based on longevity and educational attainment as the measure for
salary increase do very little to improve student achievement.
Proponents of performance pay programs believe that rewards are an inherent
part of our culture and in order to change human behavior, we must offer rewards
to those deserving of them (Sultanik, 2000).
Politicians, nation-wide, are leading the debate for performance pay in
education. More specifically, politicians in the states of Arizona, Florida, Iowa,
New Mexico, and North Carolina have embraced performance pay by (Janofsky,
2005). The researcher believes that Tennessee deserves to be added to this list
since the State passed legislation providing bonuses and differentiated pay to
educators. At the federal level, Tennessee’s, U. S. Senator, Lamar Alexander,
verbally expressed support for the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) before in
remarks before Congress. He noted that, TIF makes grants to states and cities
that are doing the best work in trying to find fair ways to reward outstanding
teachers and to reward good principals and it helps schools succeed (Alexander,
2007).
Opponents of Performance Pay
There is an ongoing debate among educators, policy makers, and the
general public on performance pay as a tool or reform to improve achievement in
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schools. The National Education Association (NEA) and American Federation of
Teachers (AFT) are the two major education organizations leading the charge
against performance pay. These organizations oppose performance pay by for
the following reasons:


Those who evaluate teacher merit or performance may unconsciously
favor people who do not challenge district policy or seem to threaten the
stability of the school with innovative approaches (Ornstein & Levine,
2000).



Taxpayers will never be able or willing to support extensive performance
pay rewards.



Incentive pay can be given to only a few teachers and/or principals. Such
a plan penalizes equally qualified teachers who are not chosen simply
because there are not enough positions eligible for incentive pay (Ornstein
& Levine, 2000).



Competition for performance pay pits one teacher against another,
encourages political games, cheating, and destroys the collegial
cooperation essential to good education (Kohn, 2003).



Factors related to achievement are so diverse that it is impossible to
identify the teacher’s impact (Ornstein & Levine, 2000).

According to Wilms and Chapleau (1999), in the last three decades, there
have been little gains in student achievement. Monetary incentives or bonuses
have failed to increase student scores on yearly tests and in some cases have
led to teachers falsifying test scores. Even worst are teachers teaching to the
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test rather than to the entire curriculum. Using student achievement on state test
as a metric for measuring a teacher’s effectiveness is highly contested. Although
there is an increase in the number of school districts around the United States
embracing high stakes testing, there also appears to be an increased in the
number of educators who are protesting how the scores are used (Shaw, 2000).
Opponents argue that there should be a more definitive way of evaluating
teachers and school systems because test scores as an evaluative metric does
not accurately measure the quality of schools and teachers (Raywid, 2002).
However, in recent years, literature suggests that the teachers and
teachers’ unions are softening their views concerning performance pay in public
education (Kisida & Riffel, 2007). Unionized teachers are beginning to drop
some long-held objections to performance pay (Dillion & Maguire, 2007).
According to (Dillion & Maguire,2007), teachers are building consensus across
the political spectrum that our education system needs to reward teachers with
bonuses or raises for improving student achievement, working with lower income
schools, or teaching subjects that are hard to staff. Some local and state teacher
unions believe that performance pay can energize veteran teachers and attract
new talented instructors to the profession.
Effects of Performance Pay Programs
Review of the Literature on Performance Pay. With pressures from the
No Child Left Behind Laws and the National Common Core Standards, many
educators are under tremendous pressure to improve student achievement.
Research shows that exemplary teachers are the most important factor in
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student’s academic achievement (Odden & Wallace, 2004). Without high quality
teachers, efforts to improve student achievement are unlikely to succeed
(Koppick, 2008). Given this, it is unfortunate that data from national reports show
that schools across the country only dismiss, on average, one teacher per year
for poor performance (Hess, 2004). For this reason, many states are looking into
performance pay initiatives.
Performance pay programs affect teacher performance in at least three
ways: (1) the focus of the teacher’s effort; (2) the amount of the teacher’s effort;
and (3) the quality of the teacher’s effort (Kelley, 2002). Incentive pay may not
be the most important incentive influencing teachers’ performance; however, it is
one of the reasons that teachers leave the field of education for other high paying
professions (Imazeki, 2005). Recent studies have shown that educators’
perceptions and attitudes are favorable to performance pay programs (Heneman,
Milanowski, & Kimball, 2007). Teachers that teach in disadvantaged and lowachieving schools, along with teachers in a younger age group find performance
pay programs most desirable (Goldhaber, 2008). Jacob and Springer (2007)
also found that African American and Hispanic teachers were more supportive of
performance pay programs than their counterparts. Goldhaber (2008) surveyed
public school teachers in 2003 and found that 50% of teachers supported a move
away from the single salary schedule model. In his study he also found that
elementary teachers were the least inclined to support performance pay
programs. According to Lewis and Springer (2008), teachers who had positive
perceptions of their principal and negative views of other teachers that were
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under performing in their school were more likely to support performance pay
programs for exemplary teachers. A recent study in 2007 that utilized data from
several school districts in the United States showed a positive relationship
between teacher pay for performance and students achievement (Gonring,
Teske, & Jupp, 2007). According to Lewis and Springer (2008), teachers were
more inclined to additional pay for additional responsibilities, teaching in lowperforming schools, or exemplary evaluations. Lewis and Springer (2008) also
found that teachers seemed less favorable to additional pay for simply teaching
in hard-to-fill subjects or incentive plans based solely on student test data.
Performance pay initiatives or reforms are most likely to be successful
when the school implements the reform, there is teacher and district support,
strong principal leadership is evident and apparent ongoing financial assistance
(Scherer, 2003).
Teacher Retention. According to Goldhaber (2006), the United States
has been in a constant need of new teachers for three major reasons: (1) The
baby boomers’ children having children, causing a 2% increase in births; (2)
Class size reduction mandates, and (3) Increased number of teachers retiring.
There is strong evidence that performance pay programs can attract and retain
quality teachers, which could increase student achievement over time (Gonring
et al., 2007).
Research has uncovered a myriad of reasons why teachers leave the
education field, including lack of support from administration, parents, and
additional state and federal mandates (Allen, 2005). Some argued that
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increased salaries were a leading factor in teacher retention. A study conducted
by Grizt and Theobold in 1996 found that increased compensation was the most
significant influence on the decision to remain in the teaching profession
(Buckley, Schneider, & Shang, 2004). This study was also important because it
showed that experienced quality teachers produced more academic gains among
students they served. On the contrary, Allen (2005), noted that while
dissatisfaction with salaries was common, it was not the most important factor
when teachers decided to leave careers in education.
Student Performance. The Obama Administration is an advocate for
students and improving student achievement and sees performance pay
programs as one possible method to achieve improvements on standardized
tests. In fact, the federal government mandated that a portion of the Race to the
Top Grant be reserved to reward teachers who show a significant increase in
growths of student achievement (Chait & Miller, 2009). Even so, paying teachers
additional incentives for improving student achievement is not by itself a sufficient
strategy for improving student achievement (Odden & Kelly, 2008). There is
evidence that now shows that a performance pay program alone will not increase
student achievement. According to Moran (2010), the National Center on
Performance Incentives at Vanderbilt University’s Peabody College of Education
found that solely rewarding teachers with incentive pay does not raise student
test scores. There must be other components that coincide with the program.
Some states are starting to use value-added models to determine true
student achievement. Kupermintz (2003) noted that a measure of student
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achievement growth is a more solid reflection of a teacher’s contribution to
student learning than the achievement status of a test given at one point in time.
Statistic models can be created to decipher a student’s growth over time based
on his or her prior achievement (E.A. Hassel & B.C. Hassel, 2007). Among the
most distinguished and widely used growth measures is the Tennessee ValueAdded Assessment System (TVAAS).
Performance Pay in Private Schools versus Public Schools
While the ultimate of goal of most schools is student achievement, private
and charter schools at times take a different route to get there. Private and
charter schools are not held to the same teacher training and certification policies
of public schools to (Podgursky, 2006). This permits private and charter schools
a larger recruitment pool to hire quality teachers than public schools. Private and
charter school also have more autonomy to use performance pay schedules
versus single salary schedules. Yet, in recent years most pay systems in private
and charter schools are comparable to those in public school systems
(Podgursky, 2006). The private and charter schools who choose to implement
performance pay programs are under no requirements that their pay system be
equal to those of other schools; therefore it’s easier to monitor and implement.
Unlike in the private and charter school sector, public school systems’
performance pay program is usually the same for every school within the school
district which at times makes the implementation process cumbersome. Thus
private and charter schools have an advantage over public schools when
implementing performance pay and recruiting talented teachers. According to
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Podgursky (2006), the more competitive environment plus the smaller institution
in addition to greater flexibility leads to greater difference in compensation
policies between private or charter schools and public schools.
Performance Pay in Action in the United States
The United States has had a long history of using performance pay
programs to increase student achievement. Many school districts have tailored
their programs to meet their needs, based on research and data (Podgursky &
Springer, 2006). Performance-based accountability systems created with the
main platform of either rewarding or issuing sanctions were passed in several
states as policy-makers looked for other means to motivate educators to
embrace new reforms (Kelley, Heneman III, & Milanowski, 2000). There has
been several success stories of performance pay programs. When implemented
effectively, they produced the desired results for the schools and states. Among
the various programs were several well-documented attempts to connect teacher
performance with teacher compensation. This section will focus on some of the
performance pay programs, some of which were successful, implemented in
various states across the United States.
Colorado. In 1994, Douglass County, Colorado became one of the first
school districts in the United States to implement a performance pay program
based on knowledge and skills-based pay and school-based pay into their
compensation schedule (Kelley, 2000). The salary schedules remained the
same but alternative pay components were added. The plan consisted of the
following components: base pay, knowledge-based pay, performance –based
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pay, skilled-based pay, responsibility pay, and group incentive awards (Kelley,
2000). There were concerns in reference to what the cost would be if every
teacher had the chance to receive the extra pay. However, during that school
year, the teacher salary resources only increased by 1.5% when the performance
pay option was added to the salary component (Kelley, 2000). Even today, the
Douglass County School System is still incorporating the performance pay
program to increase student achievement.
In 1999, the Denver Public Schools went into agreement with the Denver
Classroom Teacher Union to create the Professional Compensation System for
Teacher (ProComp). This type of performance pay program linked teacher pay
to student achievement and professional evaluations. The program was piloted
for several years in selected schools, but after many revisions and refinements,
the ProComp was adopted and implemented in 2004 (Podgursky & Springer,
2006). The ProComp consisted of the following components: Knowledge and
skills pay, professional development pay, student growth percentage, and market
incentive which were low income schools or hard to staff schools (Gratz, 2005;
Koppich, 2008). ProComp gave teachers the options of the type of salary
schedule they wanted and eliminated the traditional compensation model
(Koppich, 2008). The program was optional for teachers hired before January
2006, and was mandatory for teachers hired thereafter (Koppich, 2008). The
teacher bonuses or rewards could range from $330.00 to $7,582.00 per year.
ProComp is one of the nation’s most widely known performance pay programs.
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Iowa. Cincinnati’s public school system, the first to experiment with
performance incentives, persuaded its teachers’ union in 1997 to do a test run of
the performance pay program (Malango, 2001). After many pilots of the
program proved to be successful, in 2001 the Iowa Legislature created and
passed a bill that was designed to improve teacher quality and improve student
achievement. This would be the first state to base teacher salaries on
performance rather than seniority (Edwonk, 2006). The foundations of their
performance pay program started with two components. First, the Iowa plan
created a career ladder program which provided salary increases for teachers
when they were promoted to the next level (Rowland & Brown-Sims, 2010). New
teachers were required to successfully complete the assigned mentoring
program and excel at their comprehensive evaluation before moving to the next
level, which was the Career Teacher Level. Teachers at the Career Level were
provided with a $2,000 increase in pay, thus distinguishing them from teachers at
the Beginners Level (Wyman & Allen, 2001).

In order to be considered for the

Career Teacher Level, the teacher would have completed all assigned mentoring
and licensure requirements and had successfully demonstrated competencies in
accordance with the Iowa Teaching Standards (Blair, 2001). The next step in the
career ladder program was the Career II Teacher Level. The Career II Teacher
received an additional $5,000 in pay above the Career Teacher Level and was
given the opportunity to mentor beginning teachers. The final career ladder step
was the Advance Teacher Level. Teachers at the Advanced Level received at
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least $13,500 additionally, and were expected to take on leadership positions
within the school district (Blair, 2001).
Secondly, the Iowa plan created an incentive or performance pay
component (Wilson & Van Keuren, 2001). The performance pay plan was
designed to be a voluntary program that offered school-based financial rewards
to all certified teachers within the school for achieving district goals centered on
student achievement (Delisio, 2011). Each school district had to develop a teambased performance pay program which tied in with the district’s improvement
plan and was also approved by the local school board (Wyman & Allen, 2001).
Financial rewards of approximately $2,000 were awarded annually to teachers
and principals working in schools that showed significant gains in student
achievement (Blair, 2001).
Texas. The state of Texas implemented several performance pay
programs in the last ten years that have been known to make the teaching
profession more attractive by recognizing and rewarding talented teachers,
improving teacher morale, and preventing excellent teachers from leaving the
profession for personal or financial reasons (Terry, 2009). Governor Rick Perry
and the 79th Texas Legislature created the Governor’s Educator Excellence
Award Program (GEEAP) in 2006, which made it the single largest performancepay program in the United States (Podgursky & Springer, 2006). The GEEAP
consist of three programs: (1) the Governor’s Educator Excellent Grant (GEEG),
(2) the Texas Educator Excellent Grant (TEEG), and (3) District- Level Grants. In
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2008, GEEAP provided $330 million to high-performing schools with high poverty
rates in Texas (Terry, 2009).
If a school was selected as a GEEG School, they were mandated to use
75 percent of the funds given for direct incentives to full-time classroom teachers
(Hawke, 2006). The incentives could be based on either increased student
achievement or teacher effectiveness towards student achievement or both.
According to Besharov (2007), the other 20% of the GEEG funds could be
applied to the following: (1) professional development, (2) teacher mentoring
programs, (3) direct incentives to other school personnel, including the principal,
that aided in improved student achievement, (4) funding for after-school
programs, (5) bonuses for teachers in hard- to staff subjects, and (6) retain and
recruit programs for effective teachers.
The Texas Educator Excellence Grant (TEEG) have criteria and incentives
similar to the GEEG, however, the TEEG was awarded to school districts serving
a high percentage of high poverty or disadvantage students (Podgursky &
Springer, 2006). During the 2006-2007 school year, over 1,000 schools
qualified for the TEEG program. In the Houston Independent School District,
where teachers can make up to $10,000 in bonuses and incentives, student
achievement increased, teacher morale improved, and fewer teachers left the
profession (Terry, 2009).
The District Level Grants was opened to all school districts in the state of
Texas. According to Terry (2008), the state used state funds from the Texas
Educator Excellence Fund to supply $230 million dollars annually to districts that
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agreed with the following criteria: (1) Sixty percent of the grant must award
teachers that showed increased student achievement; (2) Stipends for teacher
mentors or coach programs, incentives for hard-to staff subjects, or bonuses to
teacher with post-baccalaureate degrees; (3) Bonuses, or incentives to
principals for leading schools with increased student achievement; and/or (4)
funding to implement components of the Milken’s Family Foundation’s Teacher
Advancement Program.
Many schools in Texas have found success with pay for performance type
programs that compensate teachers for teaching in high poverty schools,
teaching in hard-to-staff subject areas, and achieving significant student
academic gains through effective teaching and learning initiatives (Terry, 2009).
Ohio. In Cincinnati, Ohio, there were two phases implemented when
creating the performance pay program. The first phase dealt with developing a
secure research –based teacher evaluation system, and the second phase dealt
with tying teacher compensation to that system (Wyman & Allen, 2001). A career
ladder program was implemented for certified employees consisting of 5 levels.
The pay for performance program also allowed for additional bonuses or
incentives to teachers for advanced degrees, National Board Certifications, and
dual certifications. According to Odden and Kellor (2000), one popular
component favored by many teachers was that if teachers became proficient in a
particular skill, they would be compensated with additional bonuses or incentives.
The pay for performance program was implemented in the 2002-03 school year
and has been very successful in attaining its goals (Landolfi & Phillips, 2003).
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However, in recent years, Cincinnati Public School District has abandoned its
performance pay programs due to complaints from teachers that it burdened
them with more paperwork and made them feel threatened and overwhelmed
about their careers (Delisio, 2011).
North Carolina. North Carolina incorporated performance pay programs
that awarded bonuses up to $1,500.00 to principals and teachers (Vigdor, 2008).
The North Carolina’s performance pay program, the ABC’s of Public Education,
was based on standardized test score outcomes. Schools were categorized as
exemplary, meets expectations and adequate, which were based on the student
achievement levels (Heneman et al., 2007). Teachers received bonuses for
improvements, but also faced sanctions as detrimental as termination from
teaching positions if student performance levels dropped below state and district
expectations (Hodge, 2001). North Carolina has been very successful in
implementing its performance pay programs due to carefully selecting
assessment instruments, commitment to constant plan revisions and evaluations,
detailed communications to stakeholders, and staying abreast of the latest school
reforms (Kelley, 2002). Vigdor (2008) has found evidence of overall
improvement in student achievement.
Minnesota. Minnesota also has a history of implementing performance
pay programs. In 1996, the Anoka-Hennepin School District began exploring
new educational reforms when teacher shortage became a major issue (Kimball,
2002). There were not enough new teachers to fill the teacher vacancies created
by retirees, or companies who offered better paying jobs. The Anoka-Hennepin
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School District’s performance pay plan was centered on training principals with a
new evaluation system, training teachers on the new teaching standard, offering
incentives or rewards to teachers who showed significant student achievement,
establishing a teacher mentoring program, and providing focused driven
professional development (Kimball, 2002).
Anoka-Hennepin School District led the new educational reform of
performance pay in Minnesota, but in 2005, the Minnesota State legislature
passed the Q-Comp. The Q-Comp was the first state performance-pay program
of the state (Podgursky & Springer, 2007). Q-Comp incorporated the traditional
career ladder program with focused driven professional development for
teachers, while improving state standards (Hendricks, 2011). If school districts
were approved for the Q-Comp Program, they had to agree to use 60% of any
compensation increase on school district professional development and student
achievement gains (Podgursky & Springer, 2006).
Florida. There have been performance pay programs in Florida since the
late 1990’s, when it was required that school districts evaluate teachers based on
students’ academic gains on standardized tests and teachers be given additional
compensations when students made academic gains (Center for Educator
Compensation Reform, 2007). It was a state mandate that all school districts
design and implement a performance pay program by 2003. However, due to
the state’s lack of funding for the program and burdensome application
requirements, many school districts designed performance pay programs that

31

only rewarded a minority of teachers (Center for Educator Compensation
Reform, 2007).
In 2006, the Florida Legislature and the Board of Education created a
framework for how school districts should implement the performance pay
requirements (Florida Department of Education, 2007). This work led to the
establishment of three statewide performance pay programs: (1) Effectiveness
Compensation (E-Comp); (2) Special Teachers Are Rewarded (STAR); and (3)
the Merit Award Program (MAP).
The E-Comp provided a “minimum framework” for meeting the state’s
performance pay program requirement (Florida Department of Education,
2006a). E-Comp gave explicit directives on how districts would evaluate
teachers using student learning gains and the proportion of teachers that were
awarded. E-Comp maintained the connection between teacher pay and annual
evaluations, but defined how districts would measure student learning gains
(Winn, 2006). The key components of E-Comp consisted of teacher eligibility,
measure of teacher performance, award criteria and amount, funding and state
oversight. E-Comp was not fully implemented due to strong opposition from
teachers across the state. Teachers who were members of the Florida Teacher
Association argued that the state department of education did not adequately
involve teachers or principals in the design of the program (Scott, 2006), teacher
bonuses should not be solely based on a single measure of student performance
(Florida Education Association 2006), only awarding 10% of all teachers in the
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state was unfair and arbitrary (Blair, 2006), and the timetable (4 months) given to
implement the E-Comp program was unrealistic (Winchester, 2006).
The Florida Legislature heard the concerns from school districts and
teachers across the state in reference to E-Comp and in May of 2006, they
suspended E-Comp and added a new performance pay program called Special
Teachers Are Rewarded (STAR). STAR replaced E-Comp as the new
framework for school district to follow in implementing the states mandated
requirements (Center for Education Compensation Reform, 2007). The Florida
Legislature appropriated $147.5 million in funding for the first year of the STAR
program (Podgursky & Springer, 2006). According to Podgursky & Springer,
(2006) STAR had four major components: (1) eligibility declaration; (2)
determination of number of rewards; (3) evaluation instrument; and (4)
instructional personnel evaluation based on student performance. The first two
components required that all instructional personnel be eligible for the STAR
award and bonuses be paid at a level equal or greater than 5% of their current
salary to 25% of the instructional personnel (Florida Department of Education,
2007). The third and fourth components of STAR required school districts to
develop criteria for assessing student achievement and a methodology for
monitoring students’ progress over time (Metz, 2007). There had been
opposition to the STAR program due to school districts struggling to develop the
plan and negotiate it with the teacher unions. There was also difficulty in creating
new assessments that would measure the performance of teachers in non-tested
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areas (Babiarz, 2006). Teachers believed that STAR created a competitive
environment that caused unwanted stress (Metz, 2007).
In March 2007, the STAR program was replaced with the Merit Award
Program (MAP). The MAP program consisted of 60% of the award to be based
on student performance and 40% of the funds be used to award professional
practices which were measured by principal assessments/ evaluations
(Besharow, 2007). MAP received support from district personnel and teachers
across the state instantaneously after its passage from the Legislature due to the
STAR program being eliminated. Although MAP appeared to provide district
flexibility in the proportion of teachers rewarded and the award size, districts had
limited flexibility because state funding for the program did not increase from
STAR (Center for Education for Education Reform, 2007).
There are many lessons to learn from Florida’s attempts at implementing
performance pay programs. According to the Center for Educational Reform
(2007), when implementing a successful program, make sure to execute the
following: (1) Provide sufficient time for districts to develop and negotiate pay
plans; (2) Increase district buy-in with state funding; (3) Involve stakeholders in
the design process; (4) Recognize the challenge of measuring performance in
grades and subjects not covered by state assessments; (5) Weigh the costs and
benefits of rewarding teachers based on a performance ranking versus a
performance threshold; and (6) Consider multiple measures of teacher
performance.
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National Performance Pay Initiatives
While states have been active in the performance pay arena, the federal
government has also taken an active role. During the Bush Administration, the
American Board for Certification of Teacher Excellence, an education reform
group, to develop a national performance pay plan for the states. This reform
group purpose was to devise a plan to identify and/or develop master teachers
who were worthy of the merit pay in the form of bonuses or raises (Janofsky,
2005). The two most notable efforts in recent years are the Teacher Incentive
Fund and the Race to the Top competitive grant award. Race to the Top is
considered the signature education reform initiative of the Obama administration
(Roberts, 2012).
Teacher Incentive Fund. The sole purpose of the Teacher Incentive
Fund (TIF) was to support schools that implemented projects that developed
performance-based compensation systems for principals, teachers, and other
school personnel that aided in increasing student achievement which was to be
measured in part by student growth in low performing schools or schools
considered high-need (U.S. Department of Education, 2010). The U.S.
Department of Education started awarding the TIF grant to schools in 2006. The
TIF grant provided a national effort to attract and retain effective teachers in highpoverty schools by offering incentives based on teacher performance. It also
sparked reforms and conversations on how teachers were compensated (Chait &
Miller, 2009). Over time, more than $660 million dollars has been awards to
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school districts across the United States (National Center on Performance
Initiatives, 2011).
Race to the Top Competitive Grant. President Barack Obama has been
a long time advocate of rewarding teachers with additional pay if they took on
additional work, helped students excel academically, or even filled hard- to-staff
subjects or schools (Smarick, 2011). On July 24, 2009, President Barack Obama
and Secretary of Education Arne Duncan signed into law the Race to the Top
Competitive Grant Program. This program was funded with $4.35 billion from the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (National Center on
Performance Initiatives, 2011). This program was designed to provide states
with funding to sponsor educational reform efforts by: (1) Producing great
teachers and leaders; (2) improving standards and assessments; (3) developing
data systems to support teaching and learning; and (4) turning around lowachieving schools (National Center on Performance Initiatives, 2011).
Tennessee and Delaware were the first states to be awarded the competitive
grant. Tennessee received $500 million and Delaware received almost $100
million. By the end of 2011, Twenty-two states had been awarded the Race to
the Top Grant and were investing in finding key educational reforms that would
prepare more students for college and careers (U.S. Department of Education,
2011).
New Leaders for New Schools’ Effective Practice Incentive
Community (EPIC). The Effective Practice Incentive Community program
(EPIC), created by New Leaders for New Schools’ foundation, was established in
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2006 to connect principal and teacher incentive pay to a sharing network of
effective practices (Wicker, 2011). This was considered a new reform to
performance pay initiatives. EPIC was designed to identify urban schools that
had significant student achievement gains and then award the principal,
teachers, and teacher assistants for sharing their effective practices (National
Center on Performance Initiatives, n.d). The New Leaders for New Schools is a
nonprofit organization that supports high academic achievement for every child
by recruiting, preparing, and sustaining new leaders for the nation’s urban public
schools (New Leaders Epic Program, 2012). According to the National Center
on Performance Initiatives (2011), the program was funded by the U.S.
Department of Education's Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF), school districts and
charter school partners, and private philanthropic funders. The EPIC incentive in
the amount of $15.5 million have been awarded to over 5,100 principals,
assistant principals, teachers, and teacher assistants in more than 200 schools
since 2006 (New Leaders Epic Program, n.d.).
Recent Performance Pay Research
Many teachers and principals have embraced performance pay as an
educational reform initiative to improve academic achievement of students in
America’s schools. There has been pessimism about whether performance pay
systems can effectively reward good teachers. Consequently, this has prompted
studies to determine the impact of performance pay. The following three
research studies summarize the positive effects of performance pay.
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In January 2007, two economics professors at the University of Florida
released their research on the effects of performance-based pay. After analyzing
surveys from 534 schools in the United States, Professors David Figlio and
Lawrence Kenny concluded students performed better on tests when their
teachers were given performance pay increases (Brannock, 2007). The Collier
County School District in Florida is currently using the findings from this study to
promote its state mandated performance pay program (Brannock, 2007).
During the 2005-2006 academic school year, the Little Rock School
District in Arkansas provided researchers an opportunity to research the effects
of performance pay by implementing a pilot performance pay program in schools.
Schools participating in the program received more than $200,000 in total
performance bonuses for the school year (Kisida & Riffel, 2007). According to a
research team led by Gary Ritter and Joshua Barnett at the University of
Arkansas’s Department of Education Reform, those bonuses led to significantly
greater learning gains than had been achieved by the same students prior to the
program, or by students at comparable schools (Kisida & Riffel, 2007). Students
in schools where the program operated in 2005-2006 showed an improvement of
3.5 Normal Curve Equivalent points. This was a gain of nearly seven (7)
percentile points for the average student (Kisida & Riffel, 2007). According to
(Henninger, 2005), Arkansas schools participating in performance pay had two
elements well established that was necessary to a school’s success; a strong
gifted principal and a motivated teaching staff. Both are difficult to find in urban
school systems. The addition of performance pay enhanced these elements.
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In a recent review of the Tennessee Career Ladder Program, researchers
concluded that students in grades K-3 whose teachers earned performance pay
scored higher in both math and reading than those students whose teachers
were paid under the conventional structure (Keys & Dee, 2005). Overall, the
results suggest that Tennessee‘s Career Ladder Evaluation system was
successful at rewarding teachers who were relatively effective at promoting
student achievement (Keys & Dee, 2005).
Performance pay programs continue to slowly move toward the
mainstream in education reform. This is a fact that the National Education
Association (NEA) teachers union now concedes (Kisida & Riffel, 2007).
Performance pay is not a new radical approach; in fact, differentiated pay was
common as early as the 1920s. However, performance pay programs
systematically have been halted before their benefits or detriments could be
demonstrated (Kisida & Riffel, 2007).
Tennessee and Performance Pay
As noted previously in Chapter 2, the researcher believes that Tennessee
deserves to be recognized as a state making advances in the debate on
performance pay for educators especially after passage of legislation providing
bonuses and differentiated pay for educators in 2007. Even before then,
Tennessee was an active supporter of performance pay and at the forefront of
the incentive pay movement. In fact, in 1984, then-Governor Lamar Alexander
signed into law the state’s Comprehensive Education Reform Act (CERA), which
its supporters called the nation’s most ambitious statewide teacher career-ladder
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and incentive-pay program (Christiansen, 2000). A component of CERA was the
Tennessee Career Ladder Evaluation System. The Career Ladder Program
blended salary rewards with non-pecuniary benefits such as increased
professional responsibilities (Dee & Keys, 2004). This performance pay program
was a form of differentiated staffing that combined a hierarchy of professional
development (career ladder) with financial and other professional rewards. The
career ladder program consisted of five distinct stages. A Fast-track Option
allowed those who had been teaching prior to CERA to advance to a career level
subject to experience requirements and successful evaluations. The stages
were as follows:


New teachers were considered 1st year “probation.”



After the first year probation period, teachers were placed in an
Apprentice Status for 3 years. If evaluations were successful, teachers
were granted the next level on the ladder.



Career Level I in their fifth year, which afforded teachers a $1,000
performance-pay increase. After being a Career Level I teacher for five
years, teachers could re-apply for Career Level I status or apply for the
next step on the ladder.



Career Level II, which afforded teachers a $2,000 or $4,000 performance
pay increase depending on whether they selected to work ten months or
eleven months. At the end of Career Level II certificate, teachers could
apply for the highest career level, if they desired.
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Career Level III, which afforded teachers a $7,000 performance pay
increase, depending on whether they selected to work ten, eleven or
twelve months.

The design of the program was considered to be unusually sound, and the
program was well financed (Dee & Keys, 2004). The program did not establish
quotas on the number of teachers who could receive awards. Under the original
formulation of the career ladder, participation was optional for veteran teachers,
and mandatory for new teachers. This implied that it was less likely to impact
teacher morale. The program also addressed teachers’ concerns about fairness
of the assessments by relying on several data sources and evaluation
instruments. Student performance data was not used as one of the assessed
data sources. Ninety-four percent of the teachers in Tennessee chose to enter
the career-ladder program. A 1991 audit revealed that 95 percent of eligible
teachers had achieved level I certification (Dee & Keys, 2004). However, only 79
percent of teachers applying for certification at levels II and III succeeded (Dee &
Keys, 2004). Tennessee’s program was looked upon as the country’s most
comprehensive experiment in summative evaluation (Dee & Keys, 2004). The
design features of the Career Ladder Program provided a powerful test of
whether merit pay could be effective in public schools.
The results of the Tennessee Career Ladder Program were partially
successful at rewarding teachers who were relatively effective at promoting
student achievement. The qualified successes of Tennessee’s program clearly
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suggest the possibility that teacher quality can be reliably rewarded when there is
a well-designed evaluation system in place (Dee & Keys, 2004).
Currently, Chattanooga, Tennessee has one of the most promising
performance-based systems to reward teachers (Holland, 2005). The funds for
this program have been provided by the Benwood Foundation since 2001
(O’Neal, 2007). Chattanooga’s teacher reward system is focused on solving the
problem of how to raise achievement in chronically underperforming schools.
The system uses value-added assessment and other criteria. The school system
identifies the most effective teachers, whom it recruits to work in the city’s lowestperforming inner-city schools. Teachers who agree to work in these schools and
show positive value-added gains by students win $5,000 annual bonuses along
with other perks provided by a private coalition of public-school supporters. This
approach has produced significant improvements in student achievement in
these schools (Holland, 2005). The Benwood Foundation has continued to
support this reform initiative. The Foundation initially sought to improve student
performance in eight inner-city schools. However, it expanded the reform
program to eight additional elementary schools county-wide during the fall of
2007 by donating a five-year $7.3 million grant (O’Neal, 2007).
In July 2007, the Tennessee State Legislature passed Public Chapter 376,
which included House Bill 472 (Smith, 2007). The legislation focused on the role
of the school principal. The law required that school principals have a
performance contract, which includes merit or performance pay (bonuses). The
bonuses would serve as an incentive (reward) when standards were met.
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However, consequences were included in the contract when standards were not
met (Smith, 2007). The bill also required school districts to develop and
implement a differentiated pay plan under guidelines established by the state
board of education to aid in hiring and retaining highly qualified teachers in
subjects and in schools for which the district has difficulty hiring or retaining
teachers (Smith, 2007). A differentiated pay plan had to be developed and
adopted by every school district in the state by the 2008-2009 school year
(Smith, 2007).
The performance pay (bonuses) for principals and differentiated pay plan
for teachers has some similarity to the 1984 Career Ladder Program. Principals
receive performance pay based on meeting standards outlined in a performance
contract and teachers receive differentiated pay based on their teaching in
schools that are difficult to staff or in subject areas difficult to fill. However, the
Career Ladder Program was based on a well designed evaluation process to
identify and reward outstanding school leaders and teachers in Tennessee
schools.
Bill Gates, the Microsoft CEO testified in support of the Teacher Incentive
Fund (TIF) at a hearing of the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pension
(HELP) Committee on March 7, 2007 (Alexander, 2007). He testified that
experimental performance pay programs were useful laboratories and that
moving incrementally allowed people to go along with it even if, in the early days,
they were worried that the system was unproven (Alexander, 2007). Senator
Alexander praised one such experiment, a partnership between the Memphis,
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Tennessee school district and New Leaders for New Schools, and urged
cooperation between the public and private sectors in developing fair criteria for
teacher merit pay (Alexander, 2007). Memphis was one of sixteen school
districts to receive funding from the TIF in 2006. The district received $3.1 million
(Alexander, 2007). Gates added that more communities should follow Memphis’
lead in that “there should be a hundred such experiments” across the country
(Alexander, 2007).
Politicians, teachers, and principals nation-wide are leading the debate for
performance pay in education. As stated earlier, political support for
performance pay has been embraced by politicians in the states of Arizona,
Florida, Iowa, New Mexico, and North Carolina (Janofsky, 2005). In the private
sector, the Milken Family Foundation’s Teacher Advancement Program (TAP) is
the most promising teacher quality program in the country and performance pay
is embedded in TAP. TAP seeks to attract more talented people into teaching,
and to keep them there by making teaching more attractive and rewarding to
them. Teachers get the opportunity to earn higher salaries and to advance in
their profession without leaving the classroom (Holland, 2005). TAP encourages
school districts to pay competitive salaries to those who teach “hard-to-staff”
subjects in schools. The Milken model has been used at schools in Arizona,
Indiana, South Carolina, Arkansas, Texas, Colorado, Florida, Ohio, Minnesota,
and Louisiana (Holland, 2005).
Tennessee is one of the first states to receive the Race to the Top
Competitive Grant in 2010 (Roberts, 2011). The funding is presently being used
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to implement a wide variety of programs designed to improve student
achievement, offer incentive pay for teachers, and provide leadership courses for
school leaders and administrators (Tennessee Press Release Center, 2011). Of
the $4.35 billion allocated from the Race to the Top Grant, Tennessee received
$500 million. The grant ranged from small individual districts like Richard City
Special School District receiving $44,665 to large urban school districts like
Memphis City Schools receiving $68.6 million (Tennessee Press Release Center,
2011).
Across the country, there is bipartisan excitement about the potential of
instituting pay for demonstrated performance in schools (Holland, 2005).
Politicians are being echoed by advocates for performance pay in the education
community and private sector in the nation.
Summary
The review of literature has provided a wealth of information on why
performance pay programs continuously resurface in educational reform
agendas. The published literature supports the theoretical assumptions of why
and how to reward and motivate teachers to remain in the educational
profession, improve teacher effectiveness, and increase student achievement.
The literature also gives a historical perspective of performance pay programs
and its benefits and challenges from many states in America.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
Introduction
The purpose of this study is to determine the perceptions of school
principals in Southeastern United States regarding the effects of performance
pay programs on the academic achievement of students and teacher retention.
This chapter describes the methodology used to conduct the study including
details on the sample size and the sample characteristics. Finally, the instrument
used in the study is explained, as well as the procedures that were used to
analyze all data collected.
Research Questions
To address the purpose of the study, four research questions were
created to guide the study:
1. To what extent, if any, do principals perceive that teacher performance
pay programs are fair and equitable?
2. To what extent, if any, do principals perceive that teacher performance
pay programs influence the retention of teachers in schools?
3. To what extent, if any, do principals perceive that teacher performance
pay programs will enhance the quality of teacher selection?
4. To what extent, if any, do principals perceive that teacher performance
pay programs will enhance the instructional effectiveness of teachers?
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Research Design
The design of this study follows a quantitative approach. A quantitative
method of research involves a study with a focus on the collection of numerical
data and testing of hypotheses (Johnson & Christensen, 2004.) The
researcher’s choice is not based on paradigm issues and the assumptions about
the nature of reality, but rather on how the data is presented. The primary
methodology included an electronic survey instrument designed to obtain the
perceptions of principals regarding the effects of performance pay programs on
the academic achievement of students.
The survey was emailed to every Tennessee principal who is a member of
the Tennessee Principals Association (TPA) Organization from the association’s
website address. A closed-ended questionnaire was used because it is easier to
score and can be answered quickly. The survey was designed according to the
Likert Scale Model to answer the research questions.
Subjects. Surveys were collected from approximately 350 members in
the organization from various social, economic, and ethnic backgrounds. The
researcher acquired permission from the TPA Executive Director, board
members, and the University of Memphis IRB Committee to administer the
survey to all members. Once approval was received, the researcher emailed the
survey to all principals in the organization. The study participants represented
principals, assistant principals and district personnel from elementary, middle,
and high school arenas across the state of Tennessee. The participants were
asked to complete the survey online within a two week period. If data was not
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received from at least 150 participants, a reminder email was sent to all members
to complete the survey within one week. Data collection took place over a 2
week period.
Demographic Data of Participants
The sample consists of at least 150 principals in Tennessee schools;
however, approximately 300 principals were asked to participate in the survey.
The principals come from a variety of demographic backgrounds. The survey
consists of a demographic section. Each participant was asked to provide their
current position and school assignment, years employed as a principal or
administrator, and educational attainment.
Instrument
The instrument the participants completed was entitled An Examination of
Principals’ Perceptions toward Performance Pay in Tennessee Survey (2011).
The survey was created by the researcher with modifications and revisions from
the Teacher Incentive Fund Survey (2010). Dr. Reginald Green, professor at
University of Memphis, and Dr. Ernie Bentley, Executive Director of Tennessee
Principals Association, assisted with the revisions to ensure that the research
questions could be fully answered. The research constructed 30 questions. The
30 questions solicited a response on a Likert-type scale designated by (1)
Strongly Disagree, (2) Disagree, (3) Agree, and (4) Strongly Agree. The
participant’s score of the questions was the sum of the weights of the responses
checked. A high score suggested a highly favorable perception, while a low
score suggested the opposite.
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Table 1
Right Alignment
Research Question

Survey Statement Numbers_______________

1

2,3,4,5,10

2

12,13,14,23,24,29

3

11,14, 25

4

6,7,8,15,16,18,19,20,21,22,27,28,30

________________________________________________________________

In an effort to check for reliability and validity of the survey, a preliminary
draft of the questionnaire was analyzed by a panel of 26 participants consisting
of principals and assistant principals. Each reviewer was given the cover letter to
the validity form (Appendix B), the validity form (Appendix C), and the survey
(Appendix E). Suggestions for the questionnaire were provided by the
participants and adjustments to the instrument were made by the researcher.
Adjustments included the following: (1) rewording of some questions in order to
convey a clearer message; (2) substituting terminology; and (3) omission of
some of the items in Part 5 that deemed irrelevant. Table 1 provides the Right
Alignment based upon the validity of the survey.
Dr. Louis A. Franceschini III, a professor and statistician at the University
of Memphis, assisted with testing for “Internal Consistency” reliability after the
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data had been collected and analyzed from the survey. He determined that the
instrument had “Content” Validity.
Limitations
The study does not reflect the perceptions of all principals in Tennessee.
The target population for this study was principals who were members of the
Tennessee Principals Association Organization. The survey is limited to the
views and perceptions of the principals that completed and emailed the survey.
Data Collection
Once the IRB Committee, Dissertation Committee, the Tennessee
Principal Association’s Executive Director and Board Members approved the
survey, it was mailed to the members by way of their email addresses. The
email consisted of a greeting and the purpose of the survey and a link to Survey
Monkey where they were able to complete the survey online. The participants
were asked to complete the survey online within a two-week period. Data
collection took place over a three week period.
Data Analysis
The research used a quantitative design to analyze the data. Inferential
statistical analyses were conducted from the collected surveys. The dependent
variable was the principal’s perceptions of performance pay. The independent
variables were retaining teachers, enhancing academic performance of students,
and improving teacher performance.
The statistical analyses were performed using the SPSS Version 19
statistical analysis program to compute the results gathered from the study. An
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alpha level of .05 was used to determine statistical significance. Frequencies
and percentages were generated from the independent variables. Chi-Square
Goodness of Fit and the number of responses were calculated.
By obtaining the aforementioned data, the researcher discerned
perceptions principals had in reference to the positive and negative effects of
performance pay programs, and to what extent, if any, did principals perceive
that performance pay programs were fair and equitable, enhance the
instructional effectiveness of teachers, and improve the selection and retention of
quality teachers in Tennessee schools.
Summary
The ultimate purpose of the study is to determine the perceptions that
school principals have about performance pay programs in Tennessee. This
chapter reviewed the research design, research questions, and provided
participant demographics involved in the study. The instrument, An Examination
of Principals’ Perceptions toward Performance Pay in Tennessee Survey (2011),
was also described, as were data collections and analytical procedures used in
the study.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS OF DATA AND DATA ANALYSIS
Introduction
As stated in previous chapters, the purpose of this study was to discern
principals’ perceptions relative to the positive and negative effects of
performance pay programs, and to what extent, if any, did they perceive that
performance pay programs are fair and equitable, enhance the instructional
effectiveness of teachers, and improve the selection and retention of teachers in
Tennessee schools. Chapter 4 of this quantitative descriptive study presents the
results of the data collection and analysis. This chapter is designed to provide an
overview of the study, a brief description of the instruments used to collect the
data, and the results of the data analysis. The study was guided by the following
research questions:
1. To what extent, if any, do principals perceive that teacher performance
pay programs are fair and equitable?
2. To what extent, if any, do principals perceive that teacher performance
pay programs influence the retention of teachers in schools?
3. To what extent, if any, do principals perceive that teacher performance
pay programs will enhance the quality of teacher selection?
4. To what extent, if any, do principals perceive that teacher performance
pay programs will enhance the instructional effectiveness of teachers?
A statistical analysis of data collected on each research question was conducted
and the results from the data analysis are presented in narrative and in tables.
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In an effort to answer the research questions, a five-part questionnaire
survey was utilized to acquire information regarding principals’ perceptions of
performance pay programs in Tennessee. Part 1 of the survey requested the
demographic information of the participants. Part 2 requested the participants’
perceptions on whether performance pay programs are fair and equitable. Part
3 of the survey requested the participants’ perceptions on whether performance
pay programs influence teacher retention and enhance quality teacher selection.
Part 4 and 5 of the survey requested the participants’ perceptions as to whether
performance pay programs enhance instructional effectiveness of teachers which
would lead to student achievement. The participants responded to a 30 item
survey instrument created by the researcher with modifications and revisions of
the Teacher Incentive Fund Survey (2010). The instrument was entitled An
Examination of Principals’ Perceptions toward Performance Pay in Tennessee
Survey (2011). The survey presented statements with a Likert response scale
from 1 to 4. The participants responded to each statement by checking that they
strongly agreed, agreed, disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement.
The survey was validated and tested for “internal consistency” reliability by Dr.
Louis A. Franceschini III, a statistician at the University of Memphis.
The survey was emailed to Dr. Ernie Bentley, the Executive Director of the
Tennessee Principals Association (TPA) who in turn, used Survey Monkey to
email the survey to 304 TPA members consisting of principals, assistant
principals, and district personnel. A total of 154 participants responded to the
survey for a return rate of 51%.
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Demographic Data
The demographic data was collected using Part 1 of the survey. Table 2
provides a frequency distribution of the personal characteristics for the sampled
respondents. This table report the respondent’s position at the school, years
employed as a principal or administrator, personal level of educational
attainment, current school assignment, and if he/she have participated or
received any type of performance pay programs in the last 4 years. Of the 154
respondents, the highest respondent rate was that of the building level principals
or assistant principals which consisted of 92%. Only 8% of district personnel and
respondents in other positions took the survey. The district personnel and
respondents in other positions consisted of retired principals or past-principals
who were promoted to district level positions. Although, the leaders’ years
employed as a principal or administrator varied, about 90% had experience as a
principal for more than three (3) years. Of the 90% of principals having three (3)
or more years of experience, close to ½ of the respondents were employed as
principals or administrators for 3 to 10 years. Ninety-nine percent of the
respondents have earned a Master’s Degree or higher. Of the 99% of principals
having earning a Master’s Degree or higher, more than 20% have attained their
Doctoral Degree. Of the 154 respondents, the highest respondent rate was that
of the elementary school principal with 71%. Only 23% of respondents have
received some type of performance pay in four years. Seventy-seven percent of
the respondents had not received any type of performance pay in the last four
years.

54

Fair and Equitability
Research Question 1. To what extent, if any, do principals perceive that
teacher performance pay programs are fair and equitable?
To answer the first research question, participants were asked to respond
to questions 2, 3, 4, 5, and 10 of the survey which focused on the extent, if any,
that principals perceived performance pay programs to be fair and equitable. The
participants responded to each statement indicating whether they strongly
agreed, agreed, disagreed, or strongly disagreed with the statements. The
alpha level of .05 was used to determine statistical significance. The Chi Square
Goodness of Fit was used to determine whether differences between observed
frequencies of responses were statistically significant (Nicol & Pexman, 2004).
When analyzing the results of the chi square, the data revealed that participants
expressed differences of opinions regarding whether performance pay programs
are fair and equitable. The differences occurred in the specific questions.
In regards to question 2, which asked if the school had a less chance of
earning an award because of the characteristics of the student population, there
was no clear agreement or disagreement among respondents, whereas 45.7%
agreed and 54.2% disagreed. The alpha level was p = .293 with a chi square
value of 1.1% which implies no statistical significance.
In regards to question 3, which asked if performance pay systems are fair,
there was no clear agreement or disagreement among respondents, whereas
48.7% agreed and 51.3% disagreed. The alpha level was p = .744 with a chi
square value of .1% which implies no statistical significance.
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In regards to question 5, which asked if performance pay programs are
likely to continue for the foreseeable future, there was no clear agreement or
disagreement among respondents, whereas 53.7% agreed and 46.3%
disagreed. The alpha level was p =.368 with a chi square value of .8% which
implies no statistical significance.
However, question number(s) 4 and 10 showed statistical significance
which implies that the respondents showed consistency in their responses to the
statements.
In reference to question 4, respondents perceived that the performance
pay programs’ evaluation systems omit important aspects of school
administration that should be considered. Eighty-eight percent of respondents
agreed with the statement with p = .000 which was less than an alpha level of .05
and a chi-square value of 85.7%; therefore, implying statistical significance.
According to question 10, respondents perceived that performance pay
programs were likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Sixty-three percent
of respondents agreed with the statement with p = .000 which was less than an
alpha level of .05 and a chi-square value of 18%; therefore; also implying
statistical significance.
A graphic analysis of these results appears in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3
shows the frequency and percentage of the responses to each statement and
Table 4 provides the statistical analysis of those responses.
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Table 2
Demographic Characteristics of Respondents (N = 154)

Characteristic

Current assignment
Principal
Assistant Principal
District Personnel
Other

F

%

139
3
6
6

90.3
1.9
3.9
3.9

Years employed as a principal or administrator
Less than 3 years
15
3 to 10 years
74
11 to 20 years
40
21 or more years
25

9.7
48.1
26.0
16.2

Level of education attainment
Baccalaureate
Masters
Specialist
Doctorate

1
74
47
32

0.6
48.1
30.5
20.8

Current school of assignment
Elementary school
Middle school
High school
Alternative/Special Center

110
22
10
12

71.4
14.3
6.5
7.8

Received performance pay over the last four years
Yes
35
No
119

57

22.7
77.3

Table 3
Responses to Questions Concerning Fairness/Equity of Performance Pay
Programs

Item

2. Our school has less
chance of earning
an award because
of the
characteristics of
our student
population.
3. The performance
pay systems are
fair.
4. The evaluation
system omits
important aspects
of school
administration that
should be
considered.
5. The criteria to
receive an incentive
are fair.
10. The performance
pay program is
likely to continue for
the foreseeable
future.

Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

F

%

F

%

f

%

f

%

23

15.0

47

30.7

66

43.1

17

11.1

12

8.0

61

40.7

63

42.0

14

9.3

43

28.9

88

59.1

16

10.7

2

1.3

9

6.0

71

47.7

60

40.3

9

6.0

11

7.3

90

60.0

44

29.3

5

3.3
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Table 4
Chi-Square Goodness of Fit Results for Questions Concerning Fairness/Equity of
Performance Pay Programs

Item

2. Our school has less chance of
earning an award because of the
characteristics of our student
population.
3. The performance pay systems
are fair.
4. The evaluation system omits
important aspects of school
administration that should be
considered.
5. The criteria to receive an
incentive are fair.
10. The performance pay program is
likely to continue for the
foreseeable future.
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p

W

1.1

.293

0.08

0.1

.744

0.03

85.7

.000

0.75

0.8

.368

0.07

18.0

.000

0.34

Retention of Teachers
Research Question 2. To what extent, if any, do principals perceive that
teacher performance pay programs influence the retention of teachers in
schools?
To answer the second research question, participants were asked to
respond to questions 12, 13, 14, 23, 24, and 29 of the survey which focused on
the extent, if any, that principals’ perceived that performance pay programs
influence the retention of teachers in schools. When analyzing the results of the
chi square, the data revealed that participants expressed differences of opinions
regarding whether performance pay programs influenced the retention of
teachers in schools. The differences occurred in the specific questions.
Regarding question 12, which asked if performance pay programs
encouraged effective teachers to remain at their school, there was no clear
agreement or disagreement among respondents, whereas 43.7% agreed and
56.7% disagreed. The alpha level was p = .102 with a chi square value of 2.7%
which implies no statistical significance.
Regarding question 14, which asked if performance pay programs overall,
contributed to the district’s ability to attract and retain effective teachers, there
was no clear agreement or disagreement among respondents, whereas 49.3%
agreed and 50.7% disagreed. The alpha level was p = .869 with a chi square
value of 0.0% which implies no statistical significance.
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However, questions 13, 23, 24, and 29 showed statistical significance
which implies that the respondents showed consistency in their responses to the
statements.
According to question 13, respondents did not perceive that performance
pay programs encourage ineffective teachers to leave their school. Seventy-six
percent of respondents disagreed with the statement with p =.000, which was
less than an alpha level of .05 and a chi- square value of 39%; therefore,
implying statistical significance.
However, in the case of question 23, respondents perceived that when a
teacher is honored for increased student achievement, he/she should be given a
performance pay increase. Eighty percent of respondents agreed with the
statement with p = .000, which was less than an alpha level of .05 and a chisquare value of 54.1%; therefore implying statistical significance.
According to item 24, respondents perceived that when a faculty member
receives a performance pay increase, the other faculty members are more
motivated to qualify for it. Fifty-nine percent of respondents agreed with the
statement with p = .035 which was less than an alpha level of .05 and a chisquare value of 4.4; therefore, implying statistical significance.
Also in the case of item number 29, respondents perceived that as
performance pay program’s monetary value increases, teachers are more
motivated to attain it. Seventy-seven percent of respondents agreed with the
statement with p = .000 which was less than an alpha level of .05 and a chisquare value of 45.6%; therefore, also implying statistical significance.
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A graphic analysis of these results appears in Table 5 and 6. Table 5
shows the frequency and percentage of the responses to each statement and
Table 6 provides the statistical analysis of those responses.
Quality Teacher Selection
Research Question 3. To what extent, if any, do principals perceive that
teacher performance pay programs will enhance the quality of teacher selection?
To answer the third research question, participants were asked to respond
to questions 11, 14, and 25 of the survey which focused on the extent, if any, that
principals’ perceived performance pay programs will enhance teacher selection.
When analyzing the results of the chi square, the data revealed that participants
expressed differences of opinions regarding whether performance pay programs
enhance the quality of teacher selection. The differences only occurred in
question 14 of this section.
According to question 14, which asked if performance pay programs
contributes to the district’s ability to attract and retain effective teachers, there
was no clear agreement or disagreement among respondents, whereas 49.3%
agreed and 50.7% disagreed. The alpha level was p = .869 with a chi square
value of 0.0% which implies no statistical significance.
However, questions 11 and 25 showed statistical significance which
implies that the respondents showed consistency in their responses to the
statements.
According to question 11, respondents did not perceive that performance
pay programs helped to recruit effective teachers to their schools. Sixty-two
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percent of respondents disagreed with the statement with p = .002, which was
less than an alpha level of .05 and a chi- square value of 9.2%; therefore,
implying statistical significance.
In the case of question 25, respondents perceived that performance pay
programs can attract highly qualified teachers to their school. Seventy-two
percent of respondents agreed with the statement with p = .000, which was less
than an alpha level of .05 and a chi-square value of 28%; therefore implying
statistical significance.
A graphic analysis of these results appears in Table 7 and 8. Table 7
shows the frequency and percentage of the responses to each statement and
Table 8 provides the statistical analysis of those responses.
Instructional Effectiveness of Teachers
Research Question 4. To what extent, if any, do principals perceive that
teacher performance pay programs will enhance the instructional effectiveness of
teachers?
To answer the fourth research question, participants were asked to
respond to questions 6, 7, 8, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 27, 28, and 30 of the
survey which focused on the extent, if any, that principals’ perceived
performance pay programs will enhance the instructional effectiveness of
teachers. When analyzing the results of the chi square, the data revealed that
participants expressed differences of opinions regarding whether performance
pay programs enhance the instructional effectiveness of teachers. The
differences occurred in the specific questions.
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Regarding question 6, which asked if performance pay programs has
helped establish common goals for students learning and teacher instruction at
their school, there was no clear agreement or disagreement among respondents,
whereas 50.7% agreed and 49.4% disagreed. The alpha level was p = .869 with
a chi square value of 0.0% which implies no statistical significance.
Regarding question 7, which asked if changes in student achievement
were attributes to the performance pay program, there was no clear agreement
or disagreement among respondents, whereas 51.7% agreed and 48.3%
disagreed. The alpha level was p = .684 with a chi square value of 0.2% which
implies no statistical significance.
According to question 16, which asked if performance pay programs do a
good job of distinguishing effective from ineffective teachers, there was no clear
agreement or disagreement among respondents, whereas 51.3% agreed and
48.6% disagreed. The alpha level was p = .744 with a chi square value of 0.1%
which implies no statistical significance.
According to question 18, which asked if the prospect that teachers can
earn additional compensation can lead some teachers to engage in unethical
behaviors, there was no clear agreement or disagreement among respondents,
whereas 49.3% agreed and 50.7% disagreed. The alpha level was p = .870 with
a chi square value of 0.0% which implies no statistical significance.
According to question 30, which asked if performance pay programs had
any effect on the amount of time and effort dedicated by teachers, there was no
clear agreement or disagreement among respondents, whereas 51.6% agreed
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and 48.4% disagreed. The alpha level was p = .686 with a chi square value of
0.2% which implies no statistical significance.
Consequently, in the case of questions 8, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 27 and 28
showed statistical significance which implies that the respondents show
consistency in their responses to the statement.
According to question 8, respondents did not perceive that performance
pay programs made teachers more comfortable with frequent observations of
their teaching. Seventy percent of respondents disagreed with the statement
with p = .000, which was less than an alpha level of .05 and a chi- square value
of 25.3%; therefore, implying statistical significance.
However, in the case of question 15, respondents perceived that
performance pay programs encouraged teachers to work harder than prior years.
Sixty-nine percent of respondents agreed with the statement with p = .000, which
was less than an alpha level of .05 and a chi-square value of 20.9%; therefore
implying statistical significance.
According to question 19, respondents perceived that teachers have
altered the instructional practices as a result of the performance pay program.
Sixty-three percent of respondents agreed with the statement with p = .002 which
was less than an alpha level of .05 and a chi-square value of 10%; therefore,
implying statistical significance.
According to question 20, respondents perceived that performance pay
programs lead some teacher to focus too much on test-taking and not the
broader curriculum. Sixty-five percent of respondents agreed with the statement
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with p = .000 which was less than an alpha level of .05 and a chi-square value of
13.1%; therefore, implying statistical significance.
In the case of question 21, respondents perceived that performance pay
programs negatively affected the morale of teacher who did not receive an
incentive award. Sixty percent of respondents agreed with the statement with p =
.021 which was less than an alpha level of .05 and a chi-square value of 5.3%;
therefore, implying statistical significance.
According to question 22, respondents perceived that competition for
performance pay encourages teacher to improve the quality of instruction. Sixtythree percent of respondents agreed with the statement with p = .001 which was
less than an alpha level of .05 and a chi-square value of 11%; therefore, implying
statistical significance.
Also in the case of question 27, respondents perceived that performance
pay programs can improve teacher effectiveness. Seventy-four percent of
respondents agreed with the statement with p = .000 which was less than an
alpha level of .05 and a chi-square value of 33.4%; therefore, implying statistical
significance.
Lastly, in reference to question 28, respondents perceived that
performance pay programs can foster cooperation among teachers. Sixty-five
percent of respondents agreed with the statement with p = .000 which was less
than an alpha level of .05 and a chi-square value of 12.7%; therefore, also
implying statistical significance.

66

A graphic analysis of these results appears in Table 9 and 10. Table 9
shows the frequency and percentage of the responses to each statement and
Table 10 provides the statistical analysis of those responses.
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Table 5
Responses to Questions Concerning Performance Pay Programs Influence on
the Retention of Teachers in Schools

Item

12. The performance pay
program has encouraged
effective teachers to
remain at my school.
13. The performance pay
program has encouraged
ineffective teachers to
leave my school.
14. Overall, the
performance pay program
contributes to the district’s
ability to attract and retain
effective teachers.
23. When a teacher is
honored for increased
student achievement,
he/she should be given a
performance pay increase.
24. When a faculty
member receives a
performance pay increase,
the other faculty members
are motivated to qualify for
it.
29. As a performance pay
program’s monetary value
increases, teachers are
more motivated to attain it.

Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

F

%

F

%

f

%

f

%

13

8.7

52

34.7

69

46.0

16

10.7

5

3.4

31

20.9

97

65.5

15

10.1

12

8.1

61

41.2

62

41.9

13

8.8

23

15.0

99

64.7

27

17.6

4

2.6

8

5.3

81

53.3

56

36.8

7

4.6

15

9.9

102

67.5

27

17.9

7

4.6

68

Table 6
Chi-Square Goodness of Fit Results for Questions Concerning Performance Pay
Programs Influence on the Retention of Teachers in Schools



p

w

2.7

0.102

0.13

39.0

0.000

0.50

0.0

0.869

0.01

54.1

0.000

0.59

24. When a faculty member receives a
performance pay increase, the other
faculty members are motivated to
qualify for it.

4.4

0.035

0.17

29. As a performance pay program’s
monetary value increases, teachers are
more motivated to attain it.

45.6

0.000

0.54

Item

12. The performance pay program has
encouraged effective teachers to remain
at my school.
13. The performance pay program has
encouraged ineffective teachers to
leave my school.
14. Overall, the performance pay
program contributes to the district’s
ability to attract and retain effective
teachers.
23. When a teacher is honored for
increased student achievement, he/she
should be given a performance pay
increase.
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Table 7
Responses to Questions Concerning Performance Pay Programs Quality of
Teacher Selection

Item

11. The performance pay
program helped me recruit
effective teachers at my
school.
14. Overall, the
performance pay program
contributes to the district’s
ability to attract and retain
effective teachers.
25. Performance pay
programs can attract
highly qualified teachers to
your school.

Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

F

%

F

%

f

%

f

%

19

12.8

37

24.8

75

50.3

18

12.1

12

8.1

61

41.2

62

41.9

13

8.8

22

14.6

86

57.0

35

23.2

8

5.3
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Table 8
Chi-Square Goodness of Fit Results for Questions Concerning Performance Pay
Programs Quality of Teacher Selection

Item
11. The performance pay program
helped me recruit effective teachers at
my school.
14. Overall, the performance pay
program contributes to the district’s
ability to attract and retain effective
teachers.
25. Performance pay programs can
attract highly qualified teachers to your
school.
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p

W

9.2

0.002

0.24

0.0

0.869

0.01

28.0

0.000

0.43

Table 9
Responses to Questions Concerning Performance Pay Programs Instructional
Effectiveness of Teachers
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

F

%

F

%

f

%

f

%

6. The performance pay
program has helped
establish common goals
for students learning and
teacher instruction at my
school.

9

6.1

66

44.6

59

39.9

14

9.5

7. Changes in student
achievement are attributes
to the performance pay
program.

9

6.0

69

45.7

58

38.4

15

9.9

5

3.3

40

26.3

91

59.9

16

10.5

14

9.3

89

59.3

36

24.0

11

7.3

7.3

63

42.0

64

42.7

12

8.0

5.3

87

57.6

51

33.8

5

3.3

Item

8. Teachers at my school
are more comfortable with
frequent observations of
their teaching because of
the performance pay.
15. The performance pay
program encourages
teachers to work harder
than in prior years.

18. The prospect that
teachers can earn
additional compensation
11
leads some teachers to
engage in unethical
behavior.
19. Teachers have altered
the instructional practices
8
as a result of the
performance pay program.

(Table 9 Continues)
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(Table 9 Continued)
Responses to Questions Concerning Performance Pay Programs Instructional
Effectiveness of Teachers

Item
16. The performance pay
program does a good job
of distinguishing effective
from ineffective teachers.
20. Performance pay
leads some teachers to
focus too much on testtaking and not the broader
curriculum.
21. Performance pay
negatively affects the
morale of teachers who
did not receive an
incentive award.
22. Competition for
performance pay
encourages teachers to
improve the quality of
instruction.
27. Performance pay
programs can improve
teacher effectiveness.
28. Performance pay
programs can foster
cooperation among
teachers.
30. Performance pay has
no effect on the amount of
time and effort dedicated
by teachers.

Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

F

%

F

%

f

%

f

%

12

8

65

43.3

56

37.3

17

11.3

19

12.8

77

52.0

48

32.4

4

2.7

21

14.2

67

45.3

57

38.5

3

2.0

10

6.5

87

56.9

48

31.4

8

5.2

13

8.6

98

64.9

33

21.9

7

4.6

7

4.6

91

59.9

42

27.6

12

7.9

11

7.2

68

44.4

72

47.1

2

1.3
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Table 10
Chi-Square Goodness of Fit Results for Questions Concerning Performance Pay
Programs Instructional Effectiveness of Teachers

Item



p

W

6. The performance pay program has
helped establish common goals for
students learning and teacher
instruction at my school.

0.0

.869

0.01

0.2

0.684

0.03

25.3

0.000

0.41

20.9

0.000

0.37

0.00

0.870

0.01

10.0

0.002

0.26

7. Changes in student achievement are
attributes to the performance pay
program.
8. Teachers at my school are more
comfortable with frequent observations
of their teaching because of the
performance pay.
15. The performance pay program
encourages teachers to work harder
than in prior years.
18. The prospect that teachers can
earn additional compensation leads
some teachers to engage in unethical
behavior.
19. Teachers have altered the
instructional practices as a result of the
performance pay program.
(Table 10 Continues)
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(Table 10 Continued)
Chi-Square Goodness of Fit Results for Questions Concerning Performance Pay
Programs Instructional Effectiveness of Teachers

Item

16. The performance pay program
does a good job of distinguishing
effective from ineffective teachers.
20. Performance pay leads some
teachers to focus too much on testtaking and not the broader curriculum.
21. Performance pay negatively affects
the morale of teachers who did not
receive an incentive award.
22. Competition for performance pay
encourages teachers to improve the
quality of instruction.
27. Performance pay programs can
improve teacher effectiveness.
28. Performance pay programs can
foster cooperation among teachers.
30. Performance pay has no effect on
the amount of time and effort dedicated
by teachers.
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p

w

0.1

0.744

0.03

13.1

0.000

0.29

5.3

0.021

0.19

11

0.001

0.27

33.4

0.000

0.47

12.7

0.000

0.29

0.2

0.686

0.03

Summary
Overall, this chapter has presented the results from the four research
questions pertinent to this study. Descriptive and survey data provided
information helpful in determining principals’ perceptions toward performance pay
programs in Tennessee. This chapter also displayed the data collection and
method of analysis that was used to interpret the information studied. Chapter 5
will present an overview of the study and a summary of the findings.
Recommendations and recommendations for future studies are also discussed in
Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
Introduction
The United States continues to lag behind other countries when it comes
to improving student achievement. Since children are our greatest commodity,
educational leaders, politicians, and the community must invest in their future by
providing them with a world-class education. Through the years, legislators,
educators, and reformers have fought to answer the call of improving the U.S.
educational system. Performance pay programs are one method of reform that
continuously resurfaces to help promote student achievement. This study was
conducted to determine the perceptions that school principals have about
performance pay programs in Tennessee. This chapter is divided into the
following sections: statement of the problem, summary of the study, summary of
the findings, recommendations, recommendations for further research and
closing. The summary of the findings section provides a decisive summary of the
quantitative and descriptive data and the researcher’s interpretations of the
analysis presented in Chapter 4.
Statement of the Problem
During the first half of the 20th Century in the United States, teachers’
salaries were solely based on a fixed schedule based on years of experience and
educational level. This approach has been criticized for failing to attract,
motivate, and retain high-quality teachers. Many Americans see the necessity
for increasing teachers’ salaries. Moreover, they also see the importance of
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having quality teachers in the classrooms in order for students to excel. Due to
the United States’ relatively poor performance in science and math test scores, in
comparison to other countries, the government continues to stimulate interest in
the design and implementation of performance –related pay policies.
Nevertheless, lack of clarity regarding the effectiveness of performance pay
programs on the academic achievement of students continues to be an
underlining problem.
Summary of the Study
The purpose of this study was to determine the perceptions that school
principals have about teacher performance pay programs in Tennessee. By
obtaining data from the survey instrument, the researcher gained insight into the
thoughts, opinions, and desires of the Tennessee Principals concerning the
positive and negative effects of performance pay programs, and to what extent, if
any, that they perceived that performance pay programs were fair and equitable,
enhanced the instructional effectiveness of teachers, and improved the selection
and retention of quality teachers in Tennessee schools.
This study can also inform decision makers in Tennessee whether to
enhance the establishment of performance pay programs or think of other
alternatives. This study can be very beneficial to decision-makers across the
region since most states in the southeastern part of the United States are
implementing educational reform initiatives that contain some form of
performance pay programs.
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Summary of the Findings
A total of 154 members from the Tennessee Principals Association (TPA),
which consisted of principals, assistant principals and district personnel across
the state of Tennessee, took the survey instrument entitled An Examination of
Principals’ Perceptions toward Performance Pay in Tennessee Survey (2011).
Among those who took the survey, 92% of the respondents were building level
principals and assistant principals. Of the 154 respondents, the highest
respondent rate was that of the elementary school principal with 71%. Ninety
percent of principals who completed the survey had three or more years of
experience as a principal. However, it was noted that only 23% of the
respondents had received some type of performance pay compensation in the
last four years.
Research Question 1. To what extent, if any, do principals perceive that
teacher performance pay programs are fair and equitable?
The data showed that participants could not decide as a whole one way or
the other if performance pay programs were fair. There was no significant
difference in the opinions of principals in reference to three questions regarding
performance pay programs being fair and equitable. The three questions were
as follows: (1) Does our schools had a less chance of earning an award because
of the characteristic of the school; (2) Is the criteria to receive the incentives fair;
and (3) Are performance pay systems fair? There are many factors that could
play a part in the indecisiveness, but a major factor could be that most principals
that took the survey are not afforded the opportunity to participate in a
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performance pay program. Most principals also perceive that performance pay
programs are only given to a selected few; therefore, not equally implemented in
all schools (Ornstein & Levine, 2000). Eighty- eight percent (88%) of
respondents, who took the survey, do perceive that the evaluation system that
gauges most performance pay programs omits important aspects of school
administration. The aspects that relate to school administration should be given
more consideration. The aspects could range from principals having more voice
in the teacher evaluation process to principals receiving additional
compensations when their school shows significant student growth from year to
year. According to the data, 63% of principals also perceive that performance
pay programs will likely continue to be implemented within the state of
Tennessee regardless of how fair or unfair they think it may be. Principals may
have agreed with this statement due to Tennessee receiving the Race to the Top
Grant from the federal government which states that a portion of the grant must
be allocated to a performance pay program.
Research Question 2. To what extent, if any, do principals perceive that
teacher performance pay programs influence the retention of quality teachers in
schools?
The data showed that principals could not decide as a whole if
performance pay programs had influence the retention of quality teachers in
schools. There was no significant difference in the opinions of principals in
reference to two questions regarding performance pay programs influencing the
retention of teachers in schools. The questions are as follow: (1) Does
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performance pay programs encourage effective teachers to remain at their
schools; and (2) Does performance pay programs, overall, contribute to their
district’s ability to attract and retain effective teachers? There was no statistical
significance in their responses. There are many factors that enhance the
retention of teachers, however; according to the data, many principals did not
see that performance pay programs are as strong as other factors such as
school climate and culture, relationship with principal, or school/community
support. This data also supports findings from Allen (2005), which states that
compensation is important, but it is not the deciding factor when teachers leave
the profession. Seventy-six percent of principals did perceive that performance
pay programs did not encourage ineffective teachers to leave their school. This
fact could be attributed to Tennessee’s tenure laws and the amount of years it
takes to remove ineffective teachers regardless if their school is rewarded the
performance pay compensation. Principals that took the survey perceived that
when a teacher is honored for increase student achievement, he/she should be
given a performance pay increase. They also perceived that when a faculty
member receives a performance pay increase or the performance pay program
monetary value increases, the other faculty members will be more motivated to
attain it. This view or perceptions is aligned to Victor Vroom’s Expectancy
Theory, which states that rewards are extrinsic motivators and will motivate
people to produce more when given the opportunity (Green, 2005). In summary,
according to the data, principals perceive that performance pay programs do not
influence the retention of teachers; however, they do believe that it motivates
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teachers to work harder to attain it which will ultimately improve student
achievement.
Research Question 3. To what extent, if any, do principals perceive that
teacher performance pay programs will enhance the quality of teacher selection?
As stated in research question 2, the data showed that principals were
indecisive on performance pay programs ability, overall, to contribute to their
district’s ability to attract and retain effective teachers. There was no statistical
significance in their responses. However, 62% of principals perceived that
performance pay programs could help to recruit effective teachers to their school,
and 72% of principals even perceived that it could attract highly qualified
teachers to their school. This implies that principals are not certain on the
recruiting measures from the district level, but are convinced that performance
pay programs would help enhance the teacher selection at the school level. This
can be very encouraging for districts if they implement performance pay
programs where all schools can benefit in some fashion rather than a selected
few schools. Based on the literature, performance pay programs are more
effective when a school district rewards their schools /employees based on any
of the following: (1) Increased student achievement; (2) Teachers working in a
lower income school; or (3) Teacher teaching subjects that are harder to staff.
Based upon the data, principals also want to offer more compensation to those
who are highly qualified or considered an effective teacher.
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Research Question 4. To what extent, if any, do principals perceive that
teacher performance pay programs will enhance the instructional effectiveness of
teachers?
The ultimate goal of any educational reform is student achievement.
Instructional effectiveness of teachers is a very important derivative to ensure
students’ success. The data showed that principals could not decide if
performance pay programs had done the following: (1) Helped establish
common goals for students learning and teacher instruction at their school; (2)
Showed changes in student achievement; (3) Showed the prospect that teachers
can earn additional compensation which leads some teachers to engage in
unethical behavior; (4) Did a good job of distinguishing effective from ineffective
teachers; and/or (5) Had no effect on the amount of time and effort dedicated by
teachers. All of the aforementioned statements are very important to ensure
instructional effectiveness of teachers; however, based upon the data from the
respondents, there was not a real statistical significance which would move
towards a positive or negative effect of performance pay programs.
However, there were 70% of principals who disagreed with the statement
that stated teachers were more comfortable with frequent observations of their
teaching because of performance pay programs. This perception could be due
to many not fully understanding performance pay programs or not being involved
in a program. Since the state adopted a new model of teacher evaluations in
2011, teachers comfort level may be derived from the observations being made
mandatory. Sixty-five percent of principals perceived that performance pay
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programs lead some teachers to focus too much on test-taking and not enough
on the boarder curriculum. This particular statement implies that principals
perceived that teachers teach to the test to ensure their students succeed on
yearly achievement test. Most performance pay programs consider teachers’
performance from the yearly achievement test to determine if teachers will
receive the additional compensation. Sixty percent of principals perceived that
performance pay programs negatively affected the morale of teachers who did
not receive an incentive award.

This perception could be derived from some

principals believing that it is unfair to reward some teachers in the school for
showing increased student achievement and not reward others who did not show
student growth or achievement (Kohn, 20003). The abovementioned statements
would be considered a negative effect of performance pay programs.
There were several positive effects of performance pay programs that
principals perceived would enhance the instructional effectiveness of teachers.
The data revealed that 69% of principals perceived that performance pay
programs encouraged teachers to work harder than in prior years; 63% of
principals perceived that teachers have altered the instructional practices as a
result of performance pay programs; 63% of principals perceived that competition
for performance pay encouraged teachers to improve the quality of instruction;
74% of principals perceived that performance pay programs improved teacher
effectiveness; and 65% of principals perceived that performance pay programs
can foster cooperation among teachers. Overall, this data implies that
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performance pay program can improve the instructional effectiveness of teachers
if all stakeholders see the value in the program.
Recommendations
While the analysis from Tennessee principals’ perceptions from this study
may not vary much from other studies, it does suggest that if a performance pay
program is to be successful in the state of the Tennessee it must fulfill the
following:
1. The performance pay program must be open to all schools within the
district to participate and there must be a majority buy-in for the
program. All schools could participate by either offering the program
for teaching in a high poverty school, teaching in hard-to-staff areas, or
achieving significant student academic gains through effective teaching
and learning initiatives (Terry, 2009).
2. The performance pay program must be very transparent to all involved
by involving them in the designing process, and all stakeholders must
be educated on how to receive the compensation.
3. School districts will have to include other motivators, not just
performance pay compensation to increasing teacher retention and
teacher selection.
4. Performance pay program would be more beneficial if the rewards
were given to all employees of the school for increased student
achievement rather than just certain teachers that show increase in
student achievement with the students that they serve.
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5. The performance pay compensation must be significant enough
whereby teachers will want to work harder to attain the reward
(Sultanik, 2000).
6. The performance pay program must include important aspects of the
school administration.
If the aforementioned recommendations occur, performance pay programs will
aid in increased student achievement in Tennessee schools.
Are performance pay programs the new wave of educational reform?
Based upon this study, it is a viable program that can show success; however, it
cannot be a standalone program. There must be other initiatives that will aid in
student achievement.
Recommendations for Further Research
The conclusion of this study offer several recommendations for further
research. Based on previous research and the finding for this study, the
following recommendations are proposed for further study:
1. This study can be replicated, replacing sample populations with teachers
instead of principals to determine if their perceptions are similar or
different.
2. This study can be replicated, distinguishing locations of respondents –
urban or rural – to determine if their perceptions are similar or different.
3. This study can be replicated, distinguishing principal current school
assignments – elementary or secondary – to determine if their perceptions
are similar or different.
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4. This study can be replicated; distinguishing principals’ perceptions in
schools district that receive performance pay programs verses those that
do not receive such programs – to determine if there is a difference in
student achievement.
5. The State of Tennessee would benefit by conducting a longitudinal studies
of existing schools within the state that have a performance pay program
to determine the effectiveness, sustainability, and success rate at
rewarding, retaining, and recruiting highly effective teachers.
6. Application of the same research to other states would prove beneficial to
the federal government in analyzing the perceptions of principals in the
United States; therefore aiding in the development and creation of a
national policy governing performance pay programs.
Summary
In closing, as a recipient of a performance pay program, this researcher
believes that performance pay programs, if designed correctly, will enhance
student achievement. This research has outlined the practices that continue to
resurface in performance pay programs through the literature and perceptions of
Tennessee principals. The best way to enhance new programs in the future is to
listen to the voice of the stakeholders involved and learn from the past
performance pay initiatives.
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APPENDIX B

Dear Reviewer,
My name is Janice Tankson and I am a doctoral candidate at The University of
Memphis in Memphis, TN. Attached is a preliminary draft of the survey that will
be sent to members of the Tennessee Principals Association (TPA) in order to
gather principals’ perceptions toward performance pay programs in Tennessee.
Also, attached is a list of questions to review as you read over the survey. These
questions relate to the validity of the instruction. In reading and answering the
questions, please feel free to comment on any area that you feel would improve
the instrument’s content and construct.
The survey you are about to take require approximately 10-15 minutes to
complete. Your participation is completely voluntary and may be discontinued at
any time without penalty or prejudice to you. Your participation will be
anonymous. Please complete the survey and return to me at the end of the day.
Please do not discuss the answers of the survey with anyone until after all
surveys and validity questions have been collected.
Completion and return of the survey and validity questions will be considered
permission to use your responses in the study. Surveys collected will be
reviewed and utilized by me and will be destroyed after the study is completed.
Thank you in advance for taking time to assist me with my research. It is my
hope that this study will be of great value to the State of Tennessee.

Sincerely,

Janice V.Tankson
Doctoral Candidate
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APPENDIX C
VALIDITY QUESTIONS
Please keep the questions in mind as you read the questionnaire. If you have
nay suggestions or recommendations, please include them in you review.

1. Are the questions worded concisely and succinctly in order to convey the
necessary information to the participants? If not, please, include the
number of the question(s) and the recommended changes you would
make.

2. Is the use of clear terminology used? If not, please include the number of
the question(s) and any recommended changes you would make.

3. Are there any questions that appear to be redundant? If so, please
include the number of the question(s) and any changes you would make.

4. Are there any questions that need to be added? If so, please include the
recommended additions.
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APPENDIX D

Dear TPA Members,
My name is Janice Tankson. I am one of the State Directors of TPA and a
doctoral candidate at the University of Memphis. There are many changes
occurring in our state ranging from a new teacher/principal evaluation process
and more rigorous state standards to the U.S. Department of Education officially
approving our request for a waiver from certain provisions of the No Child Left
Behind Federal Laws. In an effort to ensure that our opinions are being shared in
the educational reform arena, I would like for you to participate in a research
study. The purpose of this study is to examine principals’ perceptions toward
performance pay in Tennessee. The findings from this study will give more
insight into the thoughts, opinions, and desires of Tennessee principals
concerning the positive and negative effects of performance pay and its
relationship to retaining quality teachers, the academic performance of the
school, and whether it improves teacher performance.
Your participation is extremely valuable as it will aid us in informing decision
makers on whether to enhance the establishment of performance pay programs
or think of other alternatives.
Your participation is anonymous and voluntary and your responses on the survey
are entirely confidential. At the end of the data collection period (February 1327, 2012), two participants will be selected to receive a $50.00 Visa Gift Card by
way of a drawing.
Please click on the following link if you would like to participate in this survey.
Educationally yours,
Janice V. Tankson
Doctoral Candidate
THE LINK WOULD GO HERE.
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APPENDIX E
An Examination of
Principals’ Perceptions toward Performance Pay in Tennessee Survey
(2011)
SECTION ONE: Demographics
1. What is your current assignment at your school this year?
a. Principal
b. Assistant Principal
c. District Personnel
d. Other
2. Which best describes the total number of years you have been
employed as a principal or administrator?
a. Less than 3 Years
b. 3 to 10 Years
c. 11 to 20 Years
d. 21 or more years
3. Which one best describes your personal level of education
attainment?
a. Baccalaureate
b. Masters
c. Specialist
d. Doctorate
4. Which category best describes your current school of assignment?
a. Elementary School
b. Middle School
c. High School
d. Alternative/Special Center
5. Have you received any type of performance pay at any time during
the last four years?
a. Yes
b. No
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SECTION TWO
If you could have a Performance Program that looks like the one described in
the instrument section below, do you think it would have the impacts listed.
Please mark (X) one per row, on how strongly do you agree or disagree with the
following statements about performance pay programs.

Statement
a.

b.

c.
d.

e.
f.

g.

h.

i.

j.

Strongly
Agree

The performance pay
program should be clearly
communicated to educators.
Our school has less chance
of earning an award because
of the characteristics of our
student population.
The performance pay
systems are fair.
The evaluation system
omits important aspects of
school administration that
should be considered.
The criteria to receive an
incentive are fair.
The performance pay
program has helped
establish common goals for
students learning and
teacher instruction at my
school.
Changes in student
achievement are attributes to
the performance pay
program.
Teachers at my school are
more comfortable with
frequent observations of
their teaching because of the
performance pay.
Parents and the school
community believe the
performance pay program is
important.
The performance pay
program is likely to continue
for the foreseeable future.
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Agree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

SECTION THREE
If you could have a Performance Program that looks like the one described in
the instrument section below, do you think it would have the impacts listed.
Please mark (X) one per row, on how strongly do you agree or disagree about the
effects of the performance pay program on attracting and retaining teachers at your
school.

Statement

Strongly
Agree

a. The performance pay program
helped me recruit effective
teachers at my school.
b. The performance pay program
has encouraged effective
teachers to remain at my
school.
c. The performance pay program
has encouraged ineffective
teachers to leave my school.
d. Overall, the performance pay
program contributes to the
district’s ability to attract and
retain effective teachers.
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Agree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

SECTION FOUR
If you could have a Performance Program that looks like the one described in
the instrument section below, do you think it would have the impacts listed.
Please mark (X) one per row, on how strong do you agree or disagree with the
following statement about the performance pay program for teachers in your
school/district?

Statement

Strongly
Agree

a. The performance pay
program encourages
teachers to work harder
than in prior years.
b. The performance pay
program does a good
job of distinguishing
effective from ineffective
teachers.
c. The performance pay
program contributes to
greater collegiality and
professionalism among
the staff in my school.
d. The prospect that
teachers can earn
additional compensation
leads some teachers to
engage in unethical
behavior.
e. Teachers have altered
the instructional
practices as a result of
the performance pay
program.
f. Performance pay leads
some teachers to focus
too much on test-taking
and not the broader
curriculum.
g. Performance pay
negatively affects the
morale of teachers who
did not receive an
incentive award.
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Agree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

SECTION FIVE
If you could have a Performance Program that looks like the one described in
the instrument section below, do you think it would have the impacts listed.
Please mark (X) one per row, on how strongly do you agree or disagree with the
effects of performance pay programs in general?

Statement
a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

f.

g.

h.

i.

Strongly
Agree

Competition for
performance pay
encourages teachers to
improve the quality of
instruction.
When a teacher is
honored for increased
student achievement,
he/she should be given a
performance pay increase.
When a faculty member
receives a performance
pay increase, the other
faculty members are
motivated to qualify for it.
Performance pay
programs can attract highly
qualified teachers to your
school.
Other faculty members can
react negatively when a
faculty member receives a
performance pay increase.
Performance pay programs
can improve teacher
effectiveness.
Performance pay programs
can foster cooperation
among teachers.
As a performance pay
program’s monetary value
increases, teachers are
more motivated to attain it.
Performance pay has no
effect on the amount of
time and effort dedicated
by teachers.
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Agree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

APPENDIX F

Dear TPA Members,
I would like to thank those who have taken the survey below and encourage
those that have not taken the survey that there is still time to make your opinion
matter in this study. This is a perception study designed to examine principals’
perceptions toward performance pay in Tennessee. There are many
performance pay programs that have been implemented in the state of
Tennessee. The programs range from career ladder programs to programs
designed to give additional compensation to teachers and principals for
increased student achievement.
When taking this survey, please think of the performance pay program you may
be familiar with or have been a participant. Since this is a perception study, it is
not required to have been a recipient of a performance pay program.
The findings from this study will give more insight into the thoughts, opinions, and
desires of Tennessee principals concerning the positive and negative effects of
performance pay and its relationship to retaining quality teachers, the academic
performance of the school, and whether it improves teacher performance.
Your participation is extremely valuable as it will aid us in informing decision
makers on whether to enhance the establishment of performance pay programs
or think of other alternatives. Your participation is anonymous and voluntary and
your responses on the survey are entirely confidential. At the end of the data
collection period (February 13- 27, 2012), two participants will be selected to
receive a $50.00 Visa Gift Card by way of a drawing.
Please click on the following link if you would like to participate in this survey.
Educationally yours,
Janice V. Tankson
Doctoral Candidate

THE LINK WOULD GO HERE.
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